

AIMS OF INQUIRY

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Abstract – Inquiry is an integral part of human life, and it is a goal-directed activity that has a success condition, namely the achievement of its goal. Contemporary epistemologists understand inquiry as a goal-directed activity, with the Simple View stating that an inquiry is successful if and only if its goal has been achieved. This view is supported by various philosophers, such as Avery Archer (2021) and Christoph Kelp (2020). The Zetetic Instrumental Principle, introduced by Jane Friedman (2020), states that if one wants to figure out a question, one should take the necessary means to do so. Philosophers have proposed conditions for pursuing an inquiry, such as knowing the answer to a question or not inquiring into a question while believing it. The goal of inquiry is to acquire knowledge, understanding, and certainty, and it is essential to understand the purpose and motivation behind inquiry.

My paper tackles theories relating to belief acquisition and knowledge in the process of an inquiry. A major part of the paper is tackling the issue of when inquiry is epistemically valid to conduct and when it is rationally impermissible for us to do it. The popular K-Aim asserts that the only goal of inquiry can be knowledge. I attempt to challenge the popular theory of K-Aim with alternate theories like ICB (Inquire to Confirm Belief). The theory of Imaginative Inquiry greatly contributes to my attempt at suggesting how knowledge isn't the only goal of inquiry. My aim with this paper is for people to see the goal-directed process of inquiry in a different light, an activity that can hold other goals than knowledge, and still be worthwhile. I briefly touch upon topics of credence in belief to question if knowledge itself is possible for which the K-Aim believers are rooting.

Index Terms – Epistemic Improvement, Imaginative Inquiry, Inquiry, K-Aim, Non-Interference Principle

INTRODUCTION

Inquiry is embedded into human life. I do reckon that it is a part of non-human animal lives too, but those inquiries would be of wildly different types. Whether

it be Agent Cooper investigating who killed Laura Palmer in Twin Peaks or Desdemona checking the weather app before she embarks on her hike or Miranda checking her pantry to see if she still has cat food left or me checking my shoe when I feel something pricking my foot when I walk, we are constantly inquiring. Our everyday lives are richly filled with inquiries of various sorts. Moreover, we cannot imagine to function in a world where we stop inquiring.

The question we are asking here is what are we aiming at when we inquire? We know it is scary to imagine a world where we do not inquire and accept any and all information in a nonchalant manner that is present to us. But what exactly is it that we are seeking; what is it that we are hoping to acquire when we are putting our time and energy and brains into inquiry.

INQUIRY BEING A GOAL-DIRECTED ACTIVITY

Before moving on, I wish to write about inquiry as an activity in itself and how it is understood by contemporary epistemologists. As a goal-directed or aim-directed activity¹ inquiry has a success condition, namely the achievement of its goal. A tacit assumption is that the targeted epistemic states – i.e., true beliefs, justified beliefs, knowledge, understanding, certainty, etc., as the goal of inquiry is sufficient for a successful inquiry.

Arianna Falbo (2022) states that all inquiries aim at, and hence are successful upon achieving, some epistemic improvement. Christoph Kelp (2020) asserts that for any goal-directed activity, one is released from one's commitment towards achieving the aim of that activity when one has attained success, namely the aim of that activity. In another paper (2021), Kelp says that one has attained success in one's inquiry into a certain question iff one knows the answer to that question.

¹ Here, I am using goal and aim as interchangeable terms

In the purview of all these understandings of inquiry, we get the *Simple View*, which states that an inquiry is successful if and only if its goal has been achieved.

The first reason why people might think that the Simple View is true is that for any goal-directed inquiry, its success is tied to the achievement of its goal. Many philosophers share this intuition that inquiry is no exception. For example, Avery Archer (2021) says that success has to do with whether my inquiry has achieved its goal. Kelp (2021) also takes it for granted that inquiry has a success condition, a condition under which its goal has been reached.

There is a further reason to accept the Simple View if we consider the goal-directed behaviour involved in cases of inquiry. As inquirers, we want to figure out the questions that we have. And the goal that we have in mind makes certain demands on our behaviour. Jane Friedman (2020) has introduced this Zetetic Instrumental Principle, according to which, if one wants to figure out a question; one ought to take the necessary means to figure out that question. Behaviours we undertake for figuring out those questions can only make sense in the light of our goal of inquiry. Thus, many philosophers have proposed conditions for pursuing an inquiry. Dennis Whitcomb (2010) says that it is “illegitimate” to inquire into a question when one knows its answer. Jane Friedman (2019) asserts that one “ought not” inquire into a question while believing an answer to that question. They both agree that there comes a point where continuing to inquire becomes inappropriate.

The argument here (against the Simple View) does not hinge upon whether there is a constitutive aim of inquiry. The goal or aim of inquiry need not be knowledge (as we will see further in the paper), although in this section, I will focus on knowledge as the aim of inquiry in the present argument.

CASE AGAINST THE SIMPLE VIEW

LOCKUP: Suppose I want to know whether Matt will be in his office tomorrow or not. I have a meeting with him in his office today. I could settle my question by asking him during my meeting today whether he will be in his office tomorrow. But instead, I take Matt’s key and lock him inside of his office after my meeting with him. I know that no one is in the department today, and there are no other ways for Matt to get out of his office. I have settled my question because I now

know the answer to my question whether Matt will be in his office tomorrow.

Let’s look at another example:

ERASER: Suppose that I want to know whether my eraser will be on my desk for a week. I know there are people who clean my office everyday. I know that if I knock the eraser off of my desk, I will know the answer to my question. So, I knock the eraser off of my desk. Now I know that my eraser will not be on my desk for a week and have thereby settled my question. The question arises that are both these cases of inquiry successful? In Matt’s case of inquiry, the inquiry seems successful. I aimed to know the answer, I came to know the answer. Here, according to the *Simple View*, my inquiry is successful because I have settled my question. By the same token, the *Simple View* would also predict that the case of Lockup and Eraser are cases of successful inquiry because the targeted question has been settled by knowing the answers to those questions. But I believe intuitively it can be agreed upon that there is something wrong in these two cases. It is true that I have settled my question by coming to know. But neither case seems to be a successful inquiry. One might grant that I have settled my question by coming to know but deny that I have settled my question through inquiry. In other words, I have initiated my inquiry by wanting to know my question, whether Matt will be in his office tomorrow. Rather I come to know the question to my answer by locking Matt up in his office. But locking Matt up in his office is not inquiring.

Here, the inquiring agent is somewhat playing a spectator role to observe rather than taking up actions of investigation or inquiry. This might be the reason why we understand that these two cases fall short of successful inquiry. Because the inquiring agent did not come to know the answer in the right way. The question has been settled, however, no inquiry took place. If we accept the *Simple View*, both the inquiries would count as successful because their goals have been achieved by coming to know. The *Simple View* picks out a weak, contingent sense in which the achievement of the goal of inquiry may plausibly be sufficient for being counted as successful. In the good cases i.e. the paradigmatic cases of inquiry where achieving your goal by coming to know would be sufficient to count these cases as successful. However, in the bad cases such as *Lockup* or *Eraser*, the

achievement of the goal of inquiry falls short of being successful. So, the *Simple View* fails to capture characteristics of successful inquiry, given that such a view cannot rule out successful inquiries. Cases like *Lockup* and *Eraser* have shown that achieving the goal of inquiry by settling the question is inadequate for counting inquiry as successful. And the ways in which we settle the question also matter.

NON-INTERFERENCE PRINCIPLE

In order for an inquiry to be successful, it must follow the following principle. This is the non-interference principle. S's inquiry into whether P is successful only if S's aim to close the question of whether P is not the reason that S made it the case that P or that not-P. There are two versions of the non-interference principle:

1. Causal connection: you cannot cause P or not-P if you want to find out whether P. Here, my aim to close the question, directly or indirectly, causes the fact that I will go to the office tomorrow.
2. Because of: you settle the question because you want to know. I go to the office because I aim to close the question and want to know.

The non-interference principle prohibits anyone with the inquirer's awareness from making it the case that P or not-P for the reason that S wants to know. If I want to know if Matt will be in the office tomorrow, I can lock him up. And that seems to be the wrong way to do it. The non-interference principle also applies to other people. If I want to know if Matt will be in his office tomorrow and I tell Ellen about it, and to make sure to close the question, Ellen locks Matt up in his office, that too will count as interference. If Ellen does that with my knowledge, it is interference. If she does that without my knowledge, it does not count as interference on my part. So, my inquiry seems fine. That is the interference principle proposed by Gabrielle Zhang² for an inquiry to count as successful. There are two normative implications of this view. There is a close connection between inquiry and a desire to know. In many cases, our inquiry is constituted by our desire to know. So, presumably our desire to know wouldn't be satisfied when our question is settled (when we come to know). However,

if the ways in which we come to know matter, there will be cases where our desire to know is not satisfied when our question is settled. Consider this case: I want to know the end of the film, so I inquire and I watch the film. But before I could finish it, someone came up to me and told me the end of the movie, completely spoiling the film. I wanted to settle my question, but not in that way. So, I want to inquire by coming to know in a certain way. Here, it would be said that my desire to know the end of the film is not satisfied. It is extinguished, but not satisfied; however, my question is still settled.

So, if we take the Simple View which equates settling the question and successful inquiry as equivalent, then the success condition for inquiry will not be the satisfaction condition for a desire to know. These two things will be separate.

If we start focusing on the ways in which we settle the question, this would also have normative implications on the desire to know and potentially upon curiosity, too. There is also an interesting question about if our inquiring devices know our desire to know demands to know in a certain manner.

The second implication would be that precisely because settling the question is sufficient for a successful inquiry, and the shift in attention to the ways in which we achieve our goals of inquiry is called for. So, attending to how we inquire to achieve our goals of inquiry helps us to become better inquirers. Discussion on the Simple View could also help us to deal with questions in desire to know and possibly become better inquirers.

K-AIM

The first obvious response to the question that what are we aiming at when we inquire is: Knowledge. When we inquire, we are hoping to acquire knowledge. To know something, as a means to reach another end or that knowledge being an end in itself. This view is known as the K-Aim and is popularly supported by Jane Friedman, Christoph Kelp and Jonathan Kvanvig to name a few. The proponents of the knowledge aim not only claim that knowledge is the aim of inquiry but they go a step further to assert that knowledge is the one and only aim of inquiry. If one is inquiring, their aim has to be knowledge. And if

² Gabby Zhang, a professor at Georgia State University presented her non-interference

principle at a zoom meeting on September 30, 2022

the aim is not knowledge, then the process isn't inquiry, it is something else.

Two other ideas that accompany the K-Aim are the Ignorance Norm³ and DBI (Don't Believe and Inquire). According to the Ignorance Norm, where P^Q is a complete answer to a question Q, one ought not know P^Q and inquire into Q. Jane Friedman gives an explanation of DBI, as the name suggests, that one ought not to inquire into, or have an **interrogative attitude** towards Q at time *t* and believe P^Q at *t*. In simpler language, Ignorance Norm asks you to not inquire about a question if you already have or believe that you have the complete answer (not a partial answer) to the question that you are hoping to inquire into. Furthermore, DBI suggests that it is not rationally permissible to inquire into a question at a certain time if you already believe an answer for the same question at that particular time.

In response to DBI, Jared A. Millson gives us ICB. ICB stands for Inquire to Confirm Belief. It says that one may seek to confirm that P at *t* and believe that P at *t*. ICB lets us inquire into the question of whether P while already believing that P. ICB further helps in the solidification of the idea that the sole aim of inquiry isn't knowledge. There could be other aims, namely, **improvement of epistemic position**, one that we will discuss in detail.

Before we talk more on epistemic improvement, we shall understand the problem with K-Aim a little better. People's dispositions towards K-Aim and DBI have a couple of reasons⁴. One of these reasons is the inappropriateness of certain statements. These statements just sound odd. Consider the following statements:

- 1) I know I have a spare pen, but I wonder if I do?
- 2) Lisa told me yesterday that she is bisexual but what is her sexual orientation?
- 3) Fenty discontinued their purple blush but I am curious whether they still sell it?

These statements are infelicitous and seem absurd. Why would you be wondering about something that you already know the truth about. But I believe it shows certain ingenuity on the part of the K-Aim and DBI proponents by taking into consideration very specific statements about very specific situations (and

also phrasing them differently). I wonder what happens when we twist them a little:

- 4) I know my mother broke her leg but did she really?

Now, this statement can be understood slightly differently if we add a bit of context to it. Here, the speaker believes well that their mother broke her leg, for there exists enough evidence for that, like visiting her in the hospital and talking to the doctors. But what if the mother is known for trying to fool people all the time with her over-the-top pranks. In this particular case, she had the doctors in on the joke too. This situation would validate the utterance of the above statement.

- 5) I know Iago is a fictional character but is he really?

At first instance, this statement too does not seem very logical. It is common knowledge that Iago is one of the numerous fictional characters created by Shakespeare. Following from that, this statement seems absurd. But consider that recently it has been revealed through some sources that some characters created by Shakespeare have indeed not been fictional, not inspired from real people but actually exactly real people. We do not have the knowledge of who these characters were. This news could well easily be a rumour but it could be not. Now, if we take the statement into consideration, it does seem to make a little bit of sense. This is unless we consider Kripke's idea that a fictional man still does exist.

Therefore, the question we need to ask is what happens to knowledge when doubt creeps in?

ARGUMENT OF THE K-AIM AND DBI

K-aim asserts that knowledge is the sole aim of inquiry. DBI prohibits you from inquiring if you already believe in something. Ignorance norm, finally, states that you ought not hold an interrogating attitude towards a question whose answer you already know. I will attempt to convey how all three of these norms/rules are wrong.

THE CASE AGAINST K-AIM

Starting with the K-Aim, we see how holding the K-Aim can be dangerous. K-Aim asserts that knowledge

³ Mentioned in the paper titled 'Norms of Inquiry' by Eliran Haziza

⁴ As mentioned by Arianna Falbo in her paper 'Inquiring Minds Want to Improve'

is the sole aim of inquiry. I assert that there are other goals that one can aspire towards while inquiring. Further, people do inquire even when they have knowledge and it is not epistemically wrong or questionable for them to do so. One of the many other aims of inquiry is improving one's epistemic position. There are a number of situations in our customary life where we encounter ourselves inquiring not in order to gain knowledge, but rather for epistemic improvement. Some everyday life examples would include: I know that spinach is a source of vitamin K but I might just confirm my belief by asking my mom who is a dietician. Similarly, you know the fastest route to your office as you drive there regularly, but you put on the GPS just to confirm. Consider an example. Josh is giving an exam for registration into the army. Having worked really hard in the last few months, Josh is pretty good with these problems now. So good that he is able to solve these problems mentally. Now, he is sitting in the exam, he is looking at a maths problem. He solves it mentally. He knows the answer. The answer he believes to be true is one of the options given. However, since he has ample time left with him and because the stakes in this particular situation are pretty high (of him realising his dream), he solves the problem down on pen and paper. This was done not in order to gain knowledge. There is something else Josh was looking for when he solves that question down on paper. This was certainty. He was seeking confirmation in a way. He did not doubt his knowledge, but wanted to improve his degree of certainty because it was a high-stakes situation. Such cases illustrate the rational permissibility of inquiring a question which you already know the answer to. High stake scenarios, if anything, make us better epistemic agents who are not satisfied by merely knowing but rather seek certainty.

The question arises that is seeking certainty or wanting to improve one's epistemic standing not rationally permissible in non high-stake cases. That is not the case.

Consider Jiya, who is a big Jane Austen fanatic, is waiting for her friend Riya in the friend's living room. Coincidentally, Riya's father too is a fan of Jane Austen. Among a couple of other Austen's books, Jiya finds a biography of Jane Austen lying on the table. She thinks *I know that Jane Austen was born in 1775, but since I have time to kill, I might as well check, just*

to be sure. She picks up the book to check and thinks *yeah, that's what I thought, it's 1775.*

Jiya here illustrates a case where there are no high stakes involved and still it seems quite rational to inquire into whether p while already knowing that p. A contention could be raised that these cases of Josh and Jiya aren't really cases of inquiry, since they already have knowledge. What if it is asserted that the prerequisite for inquiring is that you must not have knowledge? And if you are inquiring and you do have knowledge (even if it is inaccessible); then it does not qualify as inquiry? This already assumes the truth of K-Aim and DBI and does not form a valid argument. This leads to an ad-hoc fallacy. If K-aim defenders assert that you must be ignorant of the answer to a question Q in order to rationally inquire into Q. This seems to be an unmotivated stipulation. The defenders of K-aim need to provide an independent motivation to make this assumption.

Now the Ignorance Norm, I hold that following and propagating it encourages bad epistemic practices. It says that you ought not inquire if you already have knowledge. But who is to decide what knowledge actually is. For all our beliefs about the world, we do not have a tally book to tally if our beliefs are right or wrong. Metaphysicians are actually the best example of inquirers who keep inquiring no matter what. For all their theories about self, consciousness, otherness, the absolute; there is no objectivity to it. There is no answer, it is just theories. However, metaphysicians are never told to give up their inquiry. This goes against Friedman's DBI claim that one should not inquire if they already hold a belief regarding that question. These philosophers themselves are not aware that they do not know, they wholeheartedly believe their theories to be true knowledge. Yet, oftentimes the inquiry keeps going on.

Furthermore, I do believe that knowledge is absolute and objective. It is not subjective. However, things and propositions that we attribute knowledge to are ever-changing. History tells us that they have not been absolute. For the longest time, it was considered to be common *knowledge* in Christian dominated countries that homosexuals are perverted individuals, lesbians are connected to satanism and that gays can be converted through therapies in torturous camps. Only 50 years later, we do not consider that knowledge. Well, I do admit that this example can be passed off as ignorant foolishness of the conservative lot who

developed notions of good and evil and right and wrong, chucking reason and rationality out the window.

Let us take another example. For a long, long time people considered the Ptolemaic, geocentrism model to be true. This model that placed Earth at the centre with the Sun and other planetary bodies moving around the Earth was knowledge. It was only until 1543 when Copernicus came up with the heliocentric model which cleared up this misconception and asserted that the Sun is actually at the centre of the universe with the other bodies orbiting around it. When the heliocentric model was not discovered, the geocentric model was knowledge (for the people at the time, just like today we consider the heliocentric model to be knowledge). The geocentric model was taught to people and hailed as knowledge. Mind you, this was not just accepted popularly by the common people who had little to no knowledge of how astronomy works but also by the smartest scientists at the time. It can be argued that it never was knowledge. But the thing with such cases is that scientific beliefs regarding what is deemed knowledge keeps changing very often. We can raise the concern here that since we do have a tally book to tally all of our beliefs to check if they are knowledge or not, knowledge might not exist, but more on that later. If we are to believe that knowledge does exist, according to the Ignorance Norm, one ought not hold an investigative attitude towards a question one already knows the answer to. Regarding the question of the universe, prior to 1543, Earth being at the centre was knowledge. If Copernicus had not held an investigative attitude towards something which was deemed and fed to the entire world as knowledge, we would not have the heliocentric model with us today. Therefore, the Ignorance Norm motivates bad epistemic practices. It forbids us from wondering and asking questions and holding inquiries.

Similar was the story of the atomic model. Improving on Dalton's theory of the atomic model, J.J. Thomson in 1896 discovered electrons inside the atom with the help of the cathode ray tube experiment and gave us the plum pudding model. This was impressive. However, if his spectacular model was accepted as knowledge, we would not have Rutherford's Nucleus Theory in 1909 which stated that electrons weren't scattered in the atom like plums in a plum pudding but rather concentrated in a nucleus. Further, if Kaim

were to be followed, we would not have progressed to the Bohr's Model and finally to the latest model of Louis de Broglie & (Schrödinger), given in 1924 which tells us that electrons act as a wave as well as a particle. If we give way to the stand that it wasn't ever knowledge in the first claim, still further inquiries would go against Friedman's DBI claim that it is not rationally permissible to inquire into a question whose answer you believe you already have.

Ignorance Norm is not completely useless. It would prevent us from incessant checks before leaving the house like checking if the gas stove is turned off, if lights are switched off and if one is carrying the car keys or not. But, it still remains a propagator of bad epistemic practice. Thus, I stand that although the Ignorance Norm is important sometimes but isn't strong enough for it to be called a norm.

I would like to elaborate the case against Ignorance Norm with a few more examples. Consider that Ophelia is writing an essay on the French Revolution. She has been reading up on it for the past 2 weeks. She has acquired vast amounts of knowledge about the historical event in this time. Today, she finally sits down to write it. Surprisingly, for some reason she cannot recall the duration of the French Revolution, a rather basic fact. She knows what it is, she has read it, but just cannot remember it. She realises that it is just forgetfulness and not lack of knowledge. She just looks it up online and finds that it was 1789 to 1799. Here, Ophelia already had the knowledge. Still, she held an interrogative attitude towards the question. Her actions do not seem to be absurd. They seem to be rather common and something we can relate to on an everyday basis. According to Jane Freidman, Ophelia's actions would be termed as rationally objectionable because she violates the Ignorance Norm. I admit that this example depends on loss of memory but it is widely accepted that even in cases of loss of memory, knowledge persists.

If one is giving an exam and is unable to remember an answer due to panic or anxiety even though they know it, they try to recall it. Sometimes recalling is the best option we have available and can even prove to be quite an effective strategy to reach an answer. Recalling entails being curious about the question and wanting to know the answer. This too would be a rationally objectionable action as it violates the Ignorance Norm.

Next, we talk about the DBI claim. According to this, one ought not inquire into or have an interrogative attitude towards Q at time t and believe p^Q at t . The expression ' p^Q ' here means that the proposition p is a complete answer to the question Q. Jane Friedman, in one of her papers⁵, defends the DBI claim and also clarifies some misconceptions about it. She explains "DBI is a "wide-scope" norm. As such, DBI doesn't allow us to say that a subject shouldn't believe at a time or shouldn't inquire at a time full stop, but only issues an injunction against that combination. Moreover, DBI says nothing about how a subject should resolve her state when she does fail to conform. And even more importantly, it says nothing about whether someone who believes p^Q at t_1 should or may inquire into Q at t_2 – it says only that one shouldn't combine interrogative attitudes with particular sorts of answer-beliefs at a single time, and not that one cannot or should not inquire into a question when one previously believed a complete answer to that question."

For Friedman here, time is of importance. The time when the inquirer believes in a complete answer for question Q should not overlap with the time when they inquire/hold an interrogative attitude towards the question Q. It follows that the subject should drop their belief before they start inquiring (or inquiring again). This leaves the case of double-checkers as irrational. Consider a very genuine, everyday example. You're leaving your house, going out. Standing at your door, you slam the key into the keyhole, turn it around, you hear the lock click (implying the door is locked now). You pull out the key, and then pushing the door handle down, you try opening the door a little. Why does one do that? Why is it such a common occurrence? Why do I see almost every other person leaving his house doing this little activity? How do you respond if asked a question about that little activity? I imagine the conversation to be something like this:

"Hey, why did you just do that?"

"Do what?"

"You know, push the door handle down and try opening the door. Did you want to go back inside?"

"No. I was only checking if the door was locked."

⁵ Inquiry and Belief, Jane Friedman, 2019

⁶ Here, obviously I do not mean the incessant, paranoid double-triple-quadruple checkers.

"But why? You just turned the key and heard the lock click, didn't you?"

"Yes."

"So, did you not believe that the door was locked at the specific instant that you performed this activity?"

"I did."

"Then why did you do that?"

"Just to be sure."

We say phrases like "just to be sure", "just in case". We double-check. This isn't because we do not know or do not believe. But rather, on the off chance that there exists a lapse of judgement in our reasoning, we may correct it. It shows a slight humbleness of human nature, not being overconfident in their beliefs. Double-checking cannot be deemed irrational⁶.

According to Friedman, you need to drop your belief about the answer to a question before you start inquiring into it again⁷. When is it possible that this might happen? Consider a flat-earthier. He ardently believes that the earth is flat, he even has a youtube channel explaining his theories. He holds a complete belief with respect to the shape of the earth. But, he still inquires into that question to build further stronger arguments to convince people into believing his theory. His inquiry doesn't culminate when he has a complete belief. He inquires further in order to be able to build infallible arguments which other people too would agree to. Here, the aim of inquiry was not knowledge. It cannot be an improvement of epistemic position. It is to improve his argumentation in order to persuade other people in favour of his theory.

WHAT IS INQUIRY

We have been talking about the different aims of inquiry a lot. It's time we look into what actually constitutes inquiry. When does an activity qualify as inquiry? What are the prerequisites to something to be eligible to be called an inquiry? Is it just a mechanical action? A mental action? A combination of the two? We'll look further into that.

Friedman⁸ clarifies for us that inquiry is not just an action that one performs that qualifies it to be called an inquiry. It requires something more. For someone to qualify as an inquirer, apart from merely performing

⁷ And this needs to be a complete belief, not a partial belief.

⁸ Inquiry and Belief, 2019

the activity of an inquirer, they also need to hold a goal-directed attitude towards the question they are inquiring into. Friedman terms this goal-directed attitude as an *investigative attitude*. She draws our attention towards the distinction between genuine and ersatz inquiry, further clarifying that a goal-directed investigative attitude is a necessary condition for something to be called inquiry. She gives us the famous detective Morse example. I will take the example a step further to elucidate the necessity of investigative attitude.

I pick the typical-Morse example straight from Friedman's paper:

"The first Morse case is the normal or typical one. Morse is woken up by his telephone ringing in the early hours of the morning – a doctor in Oxford has been shot through her window while having dinner last night. Morse pulls himself together and heads to the scene of the crime. This is a normal case for Morse and he engages in a perfectly normal inquiry into who killed the doctor. He searches the scene, talks to potential witnesses, and so on. Then he discovers that the doctor was having an affair with the master of Lonsdale College, so he takes his investigation over to the college. And things go as expected there as well: he talks to more people, does more looking around, draws a few inferences, stops at the pub and eventually solves the crime."

Then, Friedman gives an example where Morse himself is the murderer and thus performs ersatz inquiry rather than genuine inquiry.

Here, as in the last case, Morse's phone rings but doesn't wake him up because he had already been up all night. He has been busy scrubbing his car, getting rid of his bloodied clothes, destroying any and all evidence since last night he shot the doctor through the window. So that no one doubts him, he has to carry on as normal. He goes to the crime scene and investigates as usual. But here, his inquiry isn't genuine, because he does not hold an investigative attitude towards the question since he already knows the answer. This, then, qualifies only as an ersatz inquiry.

⁹ I don't actually know how these reassignment of cases work. Let us assume that this is how it is done

I provide another scenario in the Morse case:

Let us assume that it is Morse's last day of work, and that he retires after today, 5 PM. At 3 PM, his phone rings and he is informed about the case of the doctor being murdered. Since he is still on the clock, he ought to go and investigate the case right away. The thing is that Morse doesn't really want to, he got the last 2 hours on his job before he retires and can finally rest. Having to go and investigate a fresh case is a very tedious task and he just isn't interested. So, he infers that he only has to run out the clock and then he will be finally free and the case will be passed onto someone else⁹. But, he also cannot just sit and while away those 2 hours. So, he goes over to the college, talks to people, does his usual looking around, questions people around like he did in the previous scenario but there is a **lack of investigative attitude** here. Morse is not concerned about solving the case at all, he just wants to run out the clock. He does not desire the answer to the question who killed the doctor. He does not even hold any attitudes of wonder or curiosity towards the situation. Thus, his actions alone with the lack of an investigative attitude qualifies only for an ersatz inquiry but not a genuine inquiry.

Talking about investigative attitudes leads to us discussing attitudes/activities closely related to them that need to be pondered upon: wonder and curiosity. I shall try to elucidate if and how wonder and curiosity are necessary or sufficient conditions to qualify an activity to be inquiry.

WONDER AND CURIOSITY

Wondering can be understood as an activity; and not an attitude. It requires time and effort and is an active pursuit or venture. A person who is wondering might hold the desire to know or might not. Wondering doesn't necessarily entail desire to know (which we will talk about in more detail later). Say, a person wondering when did the Second World War end because he needs to give the answer to his 8 year old son. He actually wants to know the answer to it. He does not want to pass on any wrong information to his kid. In this case, this person's wonder is accompanied by actual desire or want of knowledge. Take another

example, given by Friedman (2013), there is a box given to me containing something and the only way to know what is inside it is by opening the box. But there is a condition, that if I know what is in the box, it would also kill me. Here, I may still wonder what is in the box but I do not wish or desire to know what is actually in there.

Take another example. Your friend has given you a surprise present, and asked you to not open it until midnight. If you do, the present would somehow be ruined. Similarly, in this case too, you might wonder what is the present, but you do not wish to know as you do not want it to be ruined. These examples explain how wonder does not necessarily entail the desire to know. Thus, the popular view held by Michael Deigan¹⁰ that wonder is desire does not hold. Another example could work here: suppose you have a quiz on the anatomical structure of felines in 15 minutes and you are revising for it. Out of the blue, a question pops up into your head: how did dinosaurs evolve. You start wondering about it for a couple of minutes. Here, you are wondering how dinosaurs evolve but if someone were to come to you and explain it all to you right at this moment, you wouldn't want that. In case, information gets mixed up in your head and you forget what you need to remember for your quiz. Again, we see how wondering does not equate wanting to have knowledge.

From this, it follows that wondering does not always entail inquiry.

The argument that equates wondering about something to desiring knowledge about it states: *S wonders Q iff S has some-things-considered desire to know at least some suitable answer to Q, the considerations being that knowing such an answer would improve S's doxastic state with respect to an issue (namely, Q) that they care about.*

Daniel Drucker (2021)¹¹ gives the unsatisfiability of wonder as one of the reasons why wonder cannot be understood as desire. Desire is something that is satisfied. You have a desire for a really juicy burger, you eat it, and your desire is satisfied. But this isn't quite how wondering is satisfied. Wondering is something that terminates, once you find out the answer for your question. You don't always feel an incessant need to relieve yourself from the state of wondering. It is actually quite enjoyable. But if

wonder and desire do not hold any relation, does wonder hold no relation with inquiry? Probably not.

Curiosity, on the other hand, is a source of motivation to acquire knowledge. Curiosity implies wanting to know. As we understood that wondering is an activity; curiosity is an attitude. Curiosity is specifically the type of investigative attitude that Friedman says is necessary for inquiry. Wondering is more of thinking about something than wanting to know about something. The motivation for wonder need not necessarily come from wanting to know. As mentioned before, wonder is not an attitude that can be satisfied; curiosity is. Curiosity is like the itch that is satisfied once scratched. We can understand now that the sole purpose of investigative attitudes is not that they lead to inquiry. These attitudes are neither the necessary nor the sufficient condition for further to lead to an inquiry, or for an activity to qualify as inquiry.

EPISTEMIC IMPROVEMENT

I stated earlier that besides knowledge, belief, understanding being the aims of inquiry, epistemic improvement is a major one. One that goes against the K-aim, DBI and Ignorance Norm. I wish to expand on that more here. ICB (Inquire to Confirm Belief) is a zetetic norm that allows us to inquire while already knowing the answer or believing something to be the answer. DBI and ICB stand at odds here and one has to go.

The idea that *knowledge* per se of the maximum amount of things does not exist might help us here. When we are inquiring and when our inquiry ceases positively, we do not gain knowledge. All we gain is understanding. History in scientific advancements is something that helps us understand this well. The example of the atomic model that I mentioned above illuminates this point. When Neils Bohr gave his atomic model, he (and the world) accepted it as knowledge. In hindsight, we obviously believe that that was not knowledge. But, it surely was considered as knowledge. Similarly, the popular scientific "knowledge" that we hold today might not be knowledge, but only understanding. As wild as it may sound, there is a probability that there might be some new discoveries in the next couple of decades, and it

¹⁰ An Analysis of Wonder (2020)

¹¹ Wondering On And With Purpose (2021)

might be posited that there might exist only one galaxy, ours; and not a million others, as *believed* up until now.

Consider another example: you want to find out who the writer of the book *Frankenstein* is. You google it, and end up on the page on a wikipedia page of that book. There is a very high probability that it will show Mary Shelley as the author, as we believe. But there also exists some minute probability that since wikipedia is open access to everyone to edit the information on there; some prankster, thinking it would be funny, replaced Mary Shelley with Emily Bronte. Or to go a step further, the page does show Mary Shelley, but what if in reality, Mary Shelley never wrote the book, but rather her sister Claire Clairmont did.¹² In these cases, we understand how knowledge might never actually be possible. There does not exist a holy book of knowledge, that we get access to at the end of life, by which we can cross check all our knowledge claims and beliefs. This raises the question: can we even ever acquire knowledge? If not, what are we aiming at with our inquiries? If the goal of inquiry that we up until now supposed to be does not exist, we have to find another goal because inquiry is a goal-directed activity. This problem is solved by **epistemic improvement**.

Ofcourse, I cannot be as radical to chuck the word knowledge out of the vocabulary, so I will be using it in its general sense. We understand knowledge as a belief which is confirmed and justified and is true by an appropriate amount of reliable sources; and all of this evidence pushes up the credence of our belief to 1 and attribute the term knowledge to it then. But as illustrated above, there is no way we can ever achieve a full credence of 1 regarding any belief. So, what do we aim for when we inquire? We aim for epistemic improvement. We hold certain beliefs and by means of confirmation and checking, we increase our credence and further our confidence in that belief. I will present two such cases.

A. INQUIRING EVEN WHEN ONE KNOWS

Falbo (2022) gives an excellent example to illustrate this case:

¹² This is more so an issue well discussed in philosophy of language. I will not touch the topic of even if Claire Clairmont did write

Evelyn is an expert surgeon. She has spent the morning in carefully studying her patient's file and knows that it's the left kidney that needs to be removed. Prior to scrubbing in, she decided to double-check her patient's file, one last time, just to be sure that it's the left kidney. Ava, her resident, notices that she's checking the patient's chart. She turns to Lucas, a nurse, and asks him the following:

- (a) *Ava: Why is Evelyn checking the chart? Doesn't she know which kidney it is?*
- (b) *Lucas: Ofcourse, she knows. She's just checking to be sure. After all, imagine how horrible it would be if she removed the wrong kidney!*

Let us consider another example: Jaanvi is a youtuber. It is her full time-job and she earns quite well from it. She scripts, shoots and edits all of her videos. Everytime she has to post a new video, after editing, she watches her video again at least twice to make sure everything is well-edited as per her wishes, and further making sure she hasn't used any copyrighted music or her video would be demonetised. Now, here Jaanvi herself is the one who edits her videos. She knows that she didn't use any restricted video and she knows she has sequenced her clips according to her wish. But she checks again, as she takes her work very seriously and does not want to commit any mistakes. This too does not seem like an irrational act, only valid.

B. INQUIRING WHEN ONE CANNOT KNOW

Falbo (2022)¹³ presents a delightful *rain* example to best display this situation where one inquires even whereof cannot know:

*José is about to leave the house for work and he's wondering whether it will rain later. He walks over to the window, lifts the curtain, and looks up at the sky. The sky looks clear. While José doesn't **know** that it won't rain later (not even the meteorologists can know this), he becomes more confident that it won't rain later. He leaves the umbrella at the door and heads off to work.*

Now, José here is inquiring into a question the answer of which is not possible to be known, and definitely not by the inquiring he partakes in. But the act of lifting the curtain and looking up at the sky to get a rough idea of whether it will rain or not is quite a

Frankenstein, we do not make a mistake in referring to her as Mary Shelley.

¹³ Inquiring Minds Want to Improve (2022)

commonplace activity and would raise no eyebrows for its rational impermissibility. José might want to know with certainty if it will rain later or not but it is not possible for him to know that.

Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war started in October of 2023, thousands of innocent Palestinian civilians have been killed. Last checked, as of March 12, 2024, 31,184 Palestinians have been killed. Even though you might want to know the exact number of the people killed brutally by the Israeli army so far, but you can never actually know it. That knowledge exists, yes but you cannot know it (and you are aware of it). In cases as such, knowing that complete knowledge is not possible, we are obviously not aiming at knowledge with our inquiry, we are aiming at best possible understanding and the best belief which is closest to knowledge.¹⁴

DEVOUT DEBORAH¹⁵

Deborah is a student at a Catholic university. Like many of her peers, Deborah wholeheartedly believes that the catholic account of source in nature of moral truth is correct. Yet, when she enrolls in a course of moral philosophy to meet her graduation requirements, Deborah becomes engrossed in the course material. Despite her staunch belief, Deborah sincerely puzzles over the question which if any is the correct theory of morality. I believe cases like that of Devout Deborah pose a problem for Friedman's view of inquiry and specifically for the norm which Friedman calls DBI.

We can understand the argument for DBI as follows:

1. To believe is to treat a question as closed.
2. To inquire is to treat a question as open.
3. To believe and inquire is to treat a question as both closed and open.
4. To treat a question as both open and closed is irrational.
5. Therefore, DBI: One ought not believe and inquire.

Friedman's cases of Inspector Morse provide some intuitive motivations for these claims.

Believing Morse

- P: I murdered the doctor
- Wants to appear innocent
- Performs inquisitive acts

Inquiring Morse

- Q: Who murdered the doctor?
- Wants to figure out Q
- Performs inquisitive acts

The behaviour of these two Morses are outwardly identical but it seems that Believing Morse is only pretending to inquire while Inquiring Morse is genuinely inquiring. The difference between the two Morses lies in the mental attitudes that they hold. Believing Morse already believes in the answer to the question. He is not trying to figure out who killed the doctor. Mentally, for Believing Morse, the question is closed. Inquiring Morse is unsure about who killed the doctor. Mentally, Inquiring Morse treats the question as open. He genuinely tries to figure out the answer. Given their beliefs and motivations, both of their actions make sense respectively.

Irrational Morse: Treating the question as closed and still inquiring into it would make Morse irrational. Holding both of these attitudes at once would make Morse irrational. Say Morse is sitting at home, contemplating the murderous act he committed, thinking to himself that "oh yes, I finally murdered that doctor!" The phone rings, it's the Chief Superintendent, he reports that someone just murdered the doctor. Morse's jaw drops and he says that he'll be there soon. As he hangs up, he immediately starts writing down a list of suspects, wondering who murdered the doctor. In this case, where Morse both believes in an answer to Q and also sincerely inquires into Q, his state of mind seems irrational. Morse can either believe in an answer to the question or inquire into it sincerely. Both cannot take place while Morse being rational. Friedman would say that it would be rationally impermissible to do so or for Morse to state: "I fully believe that I murdered the doctor, but did I murder the doctor?" or "I murdered the doctor but who murdered the doctor?" The fact that these statements sound absurd would be further evidence, according to

¹⁴ This accompanies with itself a discussion on credences as already done above.

¹⁵ Devout Deborah case was presented by Alexandra Pelaez in a zoom meeting on April 2, 2024

Friedman, that to treat a question as both closed and open at the same time would be irrational.

Some have obviously argued that sometimes it is rational to inquire into something you already believe, like Avery Acher in his 2018 paper argues that in cases where one has forgotten the answer to a question, it is not irrational to inquire to recover that lost information. Arianna Falbo presents similar arguments. However, I don't believe that cases of forgetfulness contend head-on with the main idea driving our intuitions about the Morse cases or about DBI.

From the DBI conclusion presented above, I will reject the conclusion by rejecting premise 4: to treat a question as both closed and open is irrational. Further, there will also be a different interpretation of the premise 2: to inquire is to treat a question as open. The upshot would be a rejection of DBI as a general norm of inquiry.

Coming back to Devout Deborah, she doesn't have a *tabula rasa* mind when she enters the class, in fact, she has some deeply held commitments and core beliefs. She wholeheartedly believes in the catholic account of the source and nature of moral truth. Her case can be represented as follows:

P₁: Catholicism is the correct moral theory.

Q₁: Which, if any, is the correct theory of morality?

DBI doesn't allow this. Yet, intuitively Deborah's way of treating Q₁ as both closed and open does not seem irrational. Infact, Deborah's activity resembles a standard practice in our discipline, one which we don't think of as irrational. Deborah is only abiding by the principle of charity. According to this principle, we should interpret others in the strongest and most persuasive way possible. We should make a sincere effort in understanding the other person's perspective before evaluating it. This principle encourages open-mindedness, respectful dialogue and a willingness to consider alternative viewpoints but it doesn't demand the abandonment of our own beliefs in the process.

Following Friedman's view, the following objection might be raised against the Devout Deborah case. It might be said that Deborah does seem to be inquiring and that her inquiry does seem rational but that is because, according to this objection, Deborah is not inquiring into Q₁, rather she is inquiring into a slightly different question like Q₂: Why might someone else believe a different answer to Q₁? And DBI allows this. This way Deborah's inquiry would be rational while

keeping DBI intact. Thus, devout Deborah could not stand as a counterexample to DBI. This objection can be answered in the following manner: yes, Deborah does want to know why someone would answer Q₁ differently, so it is agreed that Deborah is inquiring into Q₂ but Deborah is also inquiring into Q₁.

Consider what it would be like if Deborah tried to answer Q₂ without considering Q₁ to be open. This might resemble a sociology classroom. She may consider for example, which cultural, economic or psychological pressures shape people's beliefs about morality? Or how different methods of communication lead to variation in moral judgements? She might try to answer Q₂ on the basis of such things as the distribution of survey answers across some population. Though these inquiries may be interesting from the perspective of the sciences, they would not provide the answer to Q₂, one that we are satisfied with in philosophy class, which requires argumentative reasons. Here, it is contended that Deborah's way of inquiring into Q₂ is by first personally through different ways trying to answer Q₁. Since Deborah's way of treating Q₁ as both closed and open seems perfectly rational, Devout Deborah retains its status as a counterexample to DBI.

THREE OPTIONS

Friedman's view gives us three possible descriptions of the case.

1. Doubting Deborah: Since it has been stipulated that Devout Deborah does not doubt her belief. So, we can rule out this option.
2. Irrational Deborah: Preliminary arguments have been made against this. So, we can rule out this option as well.
3. Pretending Deborah: This is the option we are left with.

INQUIRY OR "INQUIRY"?

One concern that can be raised here now is that why not think that Deborah who, like Believing Morse fully believes in the answer to her question is just going through the motions. Why can we not believe that Deborah is merely pretending to inquire? Afterall, this would explain why Deborah would engage in this activity without wanting to change her mind. But this way of interpreting the case also fails. This is because

cases of pretend inquiry are easy to spot when you are aware of all the facts.

Consider another case, Jenna enrolls into a moral philosophy course to satisfy her graduation requirements. The objective of this course is to investigate Q_1 (the same question as before). Jenna lacks antecedent commitments about Q_1 , and isn't bothered enough to care now. So, she uses a large language model to cheat her way through the course. To make sure her academic insincerity goes undiscovered, Jenna acts as though she is grappling with the subject matter and the course material. She nods along during lectures, looks over to her laptop, and pretends to take serious notes. She uses ChatGPT to generate interesting questions that she can raise in the class, never leading to any follow-up questions. Jenna is clearly pretending to inquire. Like Believing Morse, she performs inquisitive behaviours in order to deceive those around her. She does not treat Q_1 as open. If Deborah is pretending, there is no way to distinguish her activity from Jenna's. However, Deborah's activity as well as mental attitude is clearly different from that of Jenna's. Jenna acts as though she is inquiring. Deborah, I argue, inquires as though she does not believe. The point made here is that whatever Deborah is doing, she isn't pretending to inquire as Jenna.

So, are we forced to conclude that Deborah is irrational? That seems unacceptable. Indeed, this natural intuition we have about the Deborah case accounts for why it ever was a possibility that Deborah was inquiring into some other question or that she was pretending to inquire. What motivates the opponent to pursue either of the two options is the strong intuition that whatever Deborah is doing, she is doing something rationally permissible. Friedman's view fails to account for an accurate description of Devout Deborah. None of the options available (Doubting Deborah, Pretending Deborah, Irrational Deborah), given DBI, work.

A fourth option is suggested here: Imaginative Inquiry.

IMAGINATIVE INQUIRY

Deborah's activity is an instance of Imaginative Inquiry. Deborah is inquiring first-personally into Q_1 in an imaginative manner. The capacities required for inquiring imaginatively are the same that are required

during regular or normal question-asking. In Friedman's view, question-asking involves considering the possible ways things could be. When we think of how this framework is implemented, cognitively and psychologically, it seems to require that we branch out imaginatively. When I try to figure out where I put my keys, for example, I run through the possible answers through my head. I imagine what it would be like if, in my bag would be the answer or on my nightstand would be the answer. When Deborah inquires into Q_1 , she does the same thing. She imagines, say, what it would be like if contractualism were to be the answer. She reasons through several alternatives, for example, she evaluates potential counter-examples to contractualism and which one would work better. Or if contractualism were to be the correct answer, what would its implications include? When I inquire into the 'keys question', I imagine possible answers from my own perspective.

The difference when Deborah engages in a similar kind of inquiry is that she is not trying to figure out if contractualism is the correct moral theory, she is only trying to understand why someone else would believe that it is. Deborah's inquiry requires a further stretch of the imagination. Deborah inquires first-personally from an imaginative perspective that differs substantially from her own. We can say that Deborah's inquiring in an "on another's behalf" manner. To inquire into Q_1 , Deborah will take her belief that Catholicism is the true moral theory "off-line" i.e. she'll prevent it from playing its typical answering role.

But we don't hold our beliefs in a vacuum, independently of other beliefs. We hold our beliefs in part, because of the other beliefs that we hold. Deborah believes that Catholicism delivers the correct account of morality, in part, because she holds a myriad of other beliefs which go against that one. Thus, it's not just Q_1 that Deborah will take "off-line" or set aside. For example, Deborah may take her beliefs about God or human morality "off-line". She may take up the beliefs of someone who does not believe in religious sayings and then investigate Q_1 from there. She may entertain different explanation types or different metaphysical or ontological arguments. Note that this seems much easier than what Friedman's view recommends, namely, that Deborah gives up her whole network of beliefs in order to inquire or give up

inquiry entirely. Intuitively, the barrier to inquiry does not seem so high now.

TWO WAYS TO INQUIRE

This way of putting things is friendly to Freidman’s general framework yet it disagrees in substantive ways. Friedman’s view, which I am calling the *Full-Blooded Inquiry*, is just a way of moving oneself from a position of ignorance or doubt about some question to a state of greater confidence or full-blown belief. When, for example, I inquire about whether it will rain tomorrow, I do so because I want to settle whether it will rain. This is the kind of inquiry that DBI supposedly appropriately guides.

We can distinguish *Full-Blooded Inquiry* with *Imaginative Inquiry*. Imaginative Inquiry is a way of meaningfully exploring “the maybe”, “the what-if” and the “if-only”. When we imaginatively inquire, we engage in the cognition about the possible in a way that is epistemically compatible with our not believing things to be that way. Making a substantive doxastic change is not necessary for imaginative inquiry. This way of inquiring allows us to inquire into a question without subjecting ourselves to epistemic scrutiny. Since imaginative inquiry does not require doubt, it's not subject to DBI. What does this mean for the original argument for DBI?

Bringing back the argument for DBI from before:

1. To believe is to treat a question as closed.
2. To inquire is to treat a question as open.
3. To believe and inquire is to treat a question as both closed and open. (1,2)
4. To treat a question as both open and closed is irrational.
5. Therefore, DBI: One ought not believe and inquire. (3,4)

First of all, premise 4 is wrong. It does not generalise to all inquiries. And I'm arguing that therefore neither does DBI. The deeper reason for this has to do with the different ways that Friedman and I interpret premise 2: to inquire is to treat a question as open. Though we both agree that inquiring means treating a question as open, we disagree on what that amounts to.

¹⁶The inquiring mind: on intellectual virtues and virtue epistemology by Jason Baehr (2011)

TREATING AS OPEN

On a more expansive view, treating a question as open does not preclude believing in an answer to it. Rather than taking ‘treating as open’ to mean unanswered or unresolved, we might take it to mean more along the lines of what Baehr (2011)¹⁶ and Battaly (2018)¹⁷ have described in their discussions on open-mindedness. On this sort of view, the attitude of treating a question as open or more simply holding an inquiring attitude is a willingness to engage seriously in alternative intellectual answers. Since this is not a doxastic attitude like doubt or suspension of belief, it doesn’t come into rational conflict with belief. And when students are encouraged to inquire and are taught who to inquire in a philosophy classroom, the kind of ‘treating as open’ is tried to foster is precisely this kind. Students are expected to engage in alternative intellectual answers even when we are antecedently committed in some way or other.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Discussing the Simple View, reveals to us the gaps we have had in our understanding of inquiry as a goal-directed activity. The non-interference principle further provides us with a solution for a problem that was not thought of inquiry before, namely, that settling a question although is good, but the way it is done actually answers the question if the desire to know has been satisfied.

We are familiar with the traditional views of aims of inquiry of K-Aim and DBI (Don’t Believe and Inquire) which assert that knowledge is the sole aim of inquiry and that one should not inquire into a question which one believes to know the answer of. But we are introduced to differing views of ICB (Inquire to Confirm Belief) that talk of solidification of present beliefs and that agents can inquire to improve their epistemic position. Further, the essay tries to show the problems and existing loopholes with the traditionalistic norms of K-Aim, DBI and Ignorance Norm. There are a number of cases which explicate how these are not absolute norms. Further, we also discover what actual inquiry is and what conditions entail inquiry. This gives us the distinction between

¹⁷ Close-Mindedness and Dogmatism by Heather Battaly (2018)

genuine inquiry and ersatz inquiry: for an inquiry to be genuine, the inquiring agent should hold an investigative attitude. Talking of investigative attitudes, there also exists a distinction between the different attitudes of wondering and curiosity.

Epistemic improvement stands a strong contender against the view of K-Aim of knowledge being the only aim of knowledge. Epistemic improvement helps increase our credence in our belief, which does not seem rationally impermissible or objectionable at all. Furthermore, the Devout Deborah case, which further leads to the idea of Imaginative Inquiry poses problems for Friedman's view of inquiry. Counter cases for DBI or K-Aim or Ignorance Norm are to be understood as not only proposals to have better theories for inquiry but also promote people to be better inquiring agents.

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