AADHAAR TO DIGITAL PRIVACY: THE ENDURING LEGACY OF THE K.S. PUTTASWAMY VERDICT

N Sridevi¹, Manoj Kumar G² ¹Faculty, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar College of Law, Andhra University. ²LLM Scholar, Smt. V. D. Siddartha Law College, Krishna University

Abstract- The right to privacy is not a mere privilege granted at the discretion of the state, it is the very essence of human dignity, personal autonomy, and constitutional liberty. This article sheds light on the resounding verdict delivered by the nine-judge bench, led by then Chief Justice JS Khehar, recognizing privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, spanning 547 pages, the judgment meticulously examined the legal and philosophical underpinnings of privacy, engaging with global jurisprudence and historical precedents to reach its decisive conclusion. The Supreme Court of India's landmark judgment on August 24, 2017, solidified this very notion, reaffirming that the right to privacy is intrinsic to human dignity and liberty. This article further delves into the arguments made in respect to the subject matter by luminary personalities like Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd.), a former Karnataka High Court Judge, were some of India's finest legal minds, including Anand Grover, Meenakshi Arora, Kapil Sibal, Gopal Subramanium, and others. Their arguments underscored the growing concerns over state surveillance, data protection, and the invasive nature of the Aadhaar scheme, which sought to make biometric identification mandatory for accessing welfare benefits.

This article extensively focuses on the judgment which referred to international legal frameworks, including jurisprudence from the United States, the United Kingdom, South Africa, and the European Union, acknowledging privacy's multidimensional nature spatial, informational, and decisional. The ruling dismantled earlier precedents which had denied the constitutional status of privacy, and instead reaffirmed privacy as an inalienable right deeply embedded in the fabric of personal liberty. Beyond Aadhaar, the verdict had far-reaching implications for data protection, surveillance laws, and digital rights in India. In light of this, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, emerges as a crucial legislative framework aimed at regulating data collection, ensuring user consent, and safeguarding personal information from misuse by both state and private entities. This article explores the significance of the judgment, its impact on

fundamental rights jurisprudence in India, and the evolving landscape of digital privacy in the postverdict era, with a critical examination of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.

Index Terms- Right to Privacy, Aadhar Card Judgement, International Legal Frameworks, Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2003.

INTRODUCTION

I.

Privacy is not merely a preference, it is the bedrock of human dignity and personal liberty. The August 24, 2017 judgment^[1] by the nine-judge referral bench was an emphatic endorsement of the constitutional right to privacy. In the course of a 547 page judgment, the bench affirmed the fundamental nature of the right to privacy reading it into the values of dignity and liberty as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. With (former) CJI JS Khehar at its head, the bench comprised of Justices Jasti Chelameswar, SA Bobde, RK Agarwal, Rohinton Nariman, AM Sapre, DY Chandrachud, SK Kaul and S Abdul Nazeer. Representing Judge Puttaswamy's fight were eminent advocates Anand Grover, Meenakshi Arora, Kapil Sibal, Gopal Subramanium, Arvind Datar, Shyam Divan, Jayant Bhushan and Sajan Poovayya along with countless Indian citizens across the country who voiced themselves, mobilising others and creating awareness about the issue across social media platforms.

The judgment refers to scholarly works and jurisprudence not only in India but other legal systems such as USA, South Africa, EU and UK, while recognising a broad right to privacy with various dimensions across spatial, informational and decisional spheres. The final order^[2] has been instructive not only in its recognition of the rights to privacy but also for cutting through the inconsistencies in the body of jurisprudence in India on the issue of privacy and its consideration of

questions which would prove instructive for the courts while adjudicating on future issues related to privacy. This judgment is, without doubt, a landmark decision and joins the most important decisions on fundamental rights jurisprudence in India. In the course of this dissertation, we will dissect the various aspects of the right to privacy as put forth by this bench and other benches preceding it. As recognized by the bench itself, there is a large body of jurisprudence on privacy which has been upheld, and there are various excellent accounts of the history of cases dealing with the right to privacy in India.

In 2012, Justice KS Puttaswamy, a former Karnataka High Court Judge, filed a petition before the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the Aadhaar project due to its lack of legislative basis [since then the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and other Subsidies, benefits and services) Act was passed in 2016] and its transgressions on our fundamental rights. Over time, a number of other^[3] petitions also made their way to the apex court challenging different aspects of the Aadhaar project. The ruling on the highly contentious issue was to deal with a batch of petitions challenging the Centre's move to make Aadhaar mandatory for availing the benefits of various social welfare schemes. Aadhaar is a 12-digit random number issued by the Indian government to its residents and it requires the resident's biometric and demographic information. Even though Aadhaar is voluntary, the government's move to make it mandatory for availing schemes had raised serious concerns.

Since then, five different interim orders by the Supreme Court have stated that no person should suffer because they do not have an Aadhaar number. Aadhaar, according to the Supreme Court, could not be made mandatory to avail benefits and services from government schemes. Further, the court has limited the use of Aadhaar to only specific schemes, namely, LPG, PDS, MNREGA, National Social Assistance Program, the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojna and EPFO^[4]. The then Attorney General, Mukul Rohatgi, in a hearing before the court in July, 2015, stated that there is no constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy^[5]. His reliance was on two Supreme Court judgments in MP Sharma v. Satish Chandra^[6] and Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh^[7], both cases, decided by eight and six judge benches respectively, denied the existence of a constitutional right to privacy.

As the subsequent judgments, which upheld the right to privacy were by smaller benches, Mr. Rohatgi claimed that MP Sharma and Kharak Singh still prevailed over them, until they were overruled by a larger bench. In order to clear the judicial uncertainty around the existence of the right to privacy, the matter was referred to a constitutional bench.

Almost two years after the referral, the constitutional bench was set up to adjudicate on this issue: "In our opinion to give a quietus to the kind of controversy raised in this batch of cases once for all, it is better that the ratio decidendi of M.P. Sharma (supra) and Kharak Singh (mpra) is scrutinized and the jurisprudential correctness of the subsequent decisions of this Court where the right to privacy is either asserted or referred be examined and authoritatively decided by a Bench of appropriate strength". The questions before this bench were twofold:

a) Do the judgments in M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra and Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. lead to the conclusion that there is no fundamental right to privacy, and;

b) Whether the decisions in the later cases upholding a right to privacy were correct.

Much of the debate and discussion in the hearings before the Constitutional bench was regarding where in the Constitution a right to privacy may be located. The Constitutional Bench analysed the different provisions and tools of interpretations to read a right to privacy in Part III of the Constitution and to determine Privacy as a postulate of Dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India^[8] that guarantees the right to life and liberty.

II. JURISPRUDENCE ON ARTICLE 21

The judgment draws on the rich body of jurisprudence on Article 21 to clearly articulate this. **2.1. Preamble**

As mentioned by Gautam Bhatia, a constitutional scholar, the common thread that runs through the entire privacy judgment and the different opinions is the privacy of the individual in the Constitution^[9]. In this respect, Chandrachud J. states that the individual lies at the core of constitutional focus and the ideals of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity animate the vision of securing a dignified existence to the individual. The judgment refers to Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala^[10] to emphasise that the Preamble is a part of the

Constitution. Dignity as a constitutional value is a very important element of the scheme of protections offered in the Constitution to individuals. The constitutional foundations of privacy to the Preamble stating as follow: "The dignity of the individual encompasses the right of the individual to develop to the full extent of his potential. And this development can only be if an individual has autonomy over fundamental personal choices and control over dissemination of personal information which may be infringed through an unauthorized use of such information."

2.2. Article 21

Over the course of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the right to life and liberty under Article 21, we see repeated allusions to 'dignity' and 'life beyond animal existence in order to expand the nature and scope of protection under Article 21. The use of the dignity principle to configure the right to life is key to the idea of Article 21 going beyond protection of limbs and faculties; the right to life is included within its scope to amplify the 'right to live with human dignity. While the articulation of a normative framework to apply the concept of 'dignity' has been missing, the courts have over the course of various cases, created an inclusive list to understand dignity, which includes the ability to express oneself^[11]. Chandrachud J, thus, describes privacy as intrinsic to a dignity based idea of the right to life:

Privacy with its attendant values assures dignity to the individual and it is only when life can be enjoyed with dignity can liberty be of true substance. Privacy ensures the fulfilment of dignity and is a core value which the protection of life and liberty is intended to achieve. The autonomy of the individual is associated over matters which can be kept private. These are concerns over which there is a legitimate expectation of privacy. The body and the mind are inseparable elements of the human personality. The integrity of the body and the sanctity of the mind can exist on the foundation that each individual possesses an inalienable ability and right to preserve a private space in which the human personality can develop. Without the ability to make choices. the inviolability of the personality would be in doubt. Recognizing a zone of privacy is but an acknowledgment that each individual must be entitled to chart and pursue the course of development of personality. Hence, privacy is a postulate of human dignity itself.

2.3. Privacy as a subset of personal liberty

Any discussion of the scope of protection offered by Article 21 is incomplete without going back to the position in Gopalan^[12] which (with the exception of the opinion of J. Fazl Ali) held that articles in Part III occupied exclusive jurisdiction. Gopalan also involved a protracted discussion on the contents of the rights under Article 21. Amongst the majority itself, the opinion was divided. While Sastri J. and Mukherjea J. took the restrictive view that limiting the protections to bodily restraint and detention, Kania J. and Das J. take a broader view for it to include the right to sleep, play etc. Through RC Cooper^[13] and Maneka^[14], the Supreme Court took steps to reverse the majority opinion in Gopalan and it was established that that the freedoms and rights in Part III could be addressed by more than one provision. The expansion of personal liberty began in Kharak Singh where the with a person's right to live in his house, was held to be violative of Article 21. The Kharak Singh draws heavily from Munn v. Illinois^[15] which held life to be more than animal existence Curiously, after taking this position Kharak Singh fails to give fundamental right to privacy (analogous to the Fourth Amendment in US) under Article 21. The position taken in Kharak Singh was to extrapolate the same method of wide interpretation of personal liberty' as was accorded to "life".

Maneka which evolved the test for enumerated rights within Part III says that the claimed right must be an integral part of or of the same nature as the named right. It says that the claim must be in reality and substance nothing but an instance of the exercise of the named fundamental right. A clear reading of privacy into "personal liberty" in this judgment is effectively a correction of the inherent inconsistencies in the positions taken by the majority in Kharak Singh This passage in the judgment sums up the position of privacy as subset of liberty. The ability of the individual to protect a zone of privacy enables the realization of the full value of life and liberty. Liberty has a broader meaning of which privacy is a subset. All liberties may not be exercised in privacy. Yet others can be fulfilled only within a private space. Privacy enables the individual to retain the autonomy of the body and mind.

2.4. Scope & extent of Part III

The decision to not ground privacy only within the ambit of a specific facet of Article 21, but the court's willingness to recognise the significance of privacy to various other rights, may prove so be the most important legacy of the privacy judgment. The bench was assisted greatly by the well-reasoned arguments made by the counsels arguing on behalf of the petitioners who pointed the right of privacy to the values of autonomy, dignity and liberty, but also to specific rights such as freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association, freedom of religion and the right to equality. All the opinions agreed with this contention choosing to read privacy not just within a specific facet of liberty or dignity within Article 19^[16] but across the entire spectrum of rights enumerated under Part III depending upon the facts in question. The basis for this broad rending was that privacy is intrinsic to the right to selfdetermination and must be located not merely within the right to life and personal liberty, but to the different exercises of freedoms which privacy enables.

While this reasoning is a logical extension of the constitutional principles established in Cooper and Maneka that rights do not occupy separate and exclusive fields, but could be addressed by multiple provisions, the decision to extend this principle to the right to privacy is significant. It recognises the magnified relevance of the right to privacy in light of the increasing incursions into private spaces of individuals by both public and private actors, and the extent to which these intrusions compromise the autonomy of an individual. The following passage by Chandrachud J. sums up the significance of privacy in the exercise of rights across Part III of the Constitution:

The freedoms under Article 19 can be fulfilled where the individual is entitled to decide upon his or her preferences. Read in conjunction with Article 21, liberty enables the individual to have a choice of preferences on various facets of life including what and how one will eat, the way one will dress, the faith one will espouse and a myriad other matters on which autonomy and self-determination require a choice to be made within the privacy of the mind. The constitutional right to the freedom of religion under Article 25^[17] has implicit within it the ability to choose a faith and the freedom to express or not express those choices to the world. These are some illustrations of the manner in which privacy 8 facilitates freedom and is intrinsic to the exercise of liberty.

The Constitution does not contain a separate article telling us that privacy has been declared to be a fundamental right. Nor have we tagged the provisions of Part III with an alpha and suffixed right of privacy: this is not an act of judicial redrafting. Dignity cannot exist without privacy. Both reside within the inalienable values of life, liberty and freedom which the Constitution has recognised. Privacy is the ultimate expression of the sanctity of the individual It is a constitutional value which straddles across the spectrum of fundamental rights and protects for the individual a zone of choice and self-determination

2.5. International Instruments

The Supreme Court of India has been remarkably receptive to the principles in international law and has developed jurisprudence in active dialogue with norms in international instruments Article $51(c)^{[18]}$ of the Constitution directs the State to endeavour to, inter alia, foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another. Kesavananda Bharati is fairly instructive in its view that the court must interpret the language of the Constitution, if not intractable, which is after all a municipal law, in the light of the United Nations Charter and the solemn declaration subscribed to by India.

The Courts in India have incorporated international conventions as well as treaties in several ways. This extends to not just treaties which have been explicitly incorporated in the domestic law, but also to treaties which have not been incorporated. The most obvious example of such principles being given effect is PUCL v. Union of India^[19], in which the right to privacy was recognized in light of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (Article 17)^[20] and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (Article 12)^[21], to which India is a party, both of which recognise a right to privacy.

The ICCPR specifically casts an obligation on the signatory states to to respect, protect and fulfil its norms. The judgment also finds it relevance that while becoming a party to the ICCPR, India filed reservations against Articles 1, 9 and 13, however, no such reservation was filed against Article 17 and this indicates the acceptance of the right to privacy and a commitment to respect and protect it. Therefore, as stated in judgment:

Where there is a contradiction between international law and a domestic statute, the Court would give effect to the latter. In the present case, there is no contradiction between the international obligations which have been assumed by India and the Constitution. The Court will not readily presume any inconsistency. On the contrary, constitutional provisions must be read and interpreted in a manner which would enhance their conformity with the global human rights regime. India is a responsible member of the international community and the Court must adopt an interpretation which abides by the international commitments made by the country particularly where its constitutional and statutory mandates indicate no deviation.

Article 17 of the ICCPR states:

(i) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.

(ii) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

All the opinions, aside from that of Chelameswar J., recognise that privacy is a natural right, which exists as an inalienable, inherent and inviolable rights of individuals, and by that logic, predates and exist regardless of any other constitutional provisions to the contrary. This opinion is buttressed by a very belated, yet laudable overruling of the infamous majority opinion in ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla^[22]. The majority position in ADM Jabalpur was that the Constitution was the sole repository of fundamental rights when these rights are suspended through a scheme provided for by the same Constitution, there was no basis to claim those rights. This position has been expressly overruled by the privacy judgment which advances the proposition that some rights are not conferred by the Constitution, rather that Constitution merely recognizes what already inheres in individuals.

The position taken by Chelameswar J. is a little different. Much like his brother judges, he recognizes the right to privacy as fundamental and inalienable. However, instead to tracing this inalienable nature to natural rights which may predate the constitutional protection, he seems to view the Constitution as the source of these rights. Despite this distinction, Chelameswar J.'s opinion seems to agree to with the majority position that such rights are inalienable, and therefore may not be taken away even through a constitutional scheme.

2.6. Comparative Law

Despite having only persuasive value, comparative law has played a very significant role in shaping the case-law on privacy in India. Since M P Sharma, the courts have grappled with the extent to which comparative developments in the law on privacy should guide our own law. This judgment refers to judgments from United Kingdom, United States,

South Africa, Canada, European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of European Union and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In each of these jurisdictions, the judgment traces the history of the judicial pronouncements on privacy and how the law had evolved over time. While not having binding value as precedence, these cases are indicative of the legal positions on privacy as a right in different jurisdictions, and have tremendous persuasive value for the Supreme Court which has been willing to internalise norms developed in other jurisdictions and interpreting them instrumentally to dispense justice. The approach in reading into the different dimensions of the right to privacy, draws heavily from foreign jurisprudence, and exhibits the Indian court's approach to assimilate international judicial interpretive trends. This is extremely important as the fundamental rights must constantly evolve beyond mere textualism to fulfill their role in a changing world.

The bench has done an exemplary job of clearly laying down the basis for the so right, and has removed any doubt not only about the existence of the right draw it from. The most significant takeaways from this part of the judgment is for the right privacy is inalienable and may not be taken away under any constitutional scheme, further, the right to privacy rests not merely in any one aspect of liberty.

III. DPDP ACT, 2023 : COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS

In light of increasing concerns over data security and individual privacy, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 emerges as a crucial legislative framework aimed at regulating data collection, ensuring user consent, and safeguarding personal information from misuse by both state and private entities. The Act aligns itself with the constitutional mandate of protecting personal liberty while addressing the challenges posed by evolving digital technologies. The recognition of privacy as a fundamental right in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) laid a strong foundation for the development of comprehensive data protection laws in India. The Supreme Court, in this landmark judgment, emphasized that privacy is intrinsic to human dignity and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. This ruling set a precedent that mandated the government to enact laws ensuring that personal data remains protected against unauthorized access and misuse.

3.1. Key Provisions of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023

The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 addresses several concerns raised in the Puttaswamy judgment by outlining stringent guidelines on data processing, user rights, and responsibilities of data fiduciaries. Some of its most significant provisions include:

(i) Explicit User Consent (Section 6)

The Act mandates that personal data cannot be processed without the individual's explicit consent, reinforcing the principle that individuals have control over their personal information. Data fiduciaries (entities that collect and process data) must obtain informed consent before collecting, storing, or sharing personal data.

(ii) Right to Correction and Erasure (Section 12)

Individuals have the right to correct inaccurate data and request its erasure under specific conditions. This provision aligns with the right to be forgotten, a concept that grants individuals control over their online presence and the ability to request removal of personal data.

(iii) Obligations on Data Fiduciaries (Sections 8 & 9)

Organizations collecting personal data must ensure its protection, transparency, and compliance with regulations to prevent misuse or unauthorized access. They are required to implement stringent security measures and adopt a data minimization approach, ensuring that only necessary information is collected and stored.

(iv) Cross-Border Data Flow Regulations (Section 16)

The Act imposes restrictions on transferring sensitive personal data outside India. Certain categories of data may be stored only within Indian territory, ensuring that citizens' data remains secure and protected from foreign jurisdictional influences.

(v) Penalties for Breach (Section 25)

The Act prescribes stringent penalties for noncompliance and data breaches. Organizations found violating data protection norms could face fines amounting to hundreds of crores, reinforcing accountability among data handlers.

(vi) Government Exemptions and Surveillance Concerns (Section 18)

One of the most debated provisions is **Section 18**, which grants exemptions to government agencies for data processing without consent in cases of national security, public interest, or law enforcement. While

this aims to enhance national security and governance efficiency, it also raises concerns about potential surveillance and misuse of personal data by state agencies.

3.2. Comparison with Global Data Protection Frameworks

A comparative analysis with international frameworks such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the European Union and the United States' sectoral data protection approach reveals that India's Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 aligns with global best practices while tailoring its provisions to suit the country's sociolegal landscape.

- **GDPR (European Union)**: Unlike India's law, GDPR provides a right to data portability and strong independent oversight through Data Protection Authorities (DPAs). The DPDP Act, however, lacks an independent regulatory body, raising concerns about enforcement.
- United States Approach: The US follows a sectoral approach, with different laws governing different industries. The DPDP Act takes a more uniform approach by covering all entities handling personal data.

IV. Suggestions & Conclusion

The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, represents a crucial step in India's efforts to regulate data privacy and security. However, several challenges hinder its effective implementation, raising concerns among stakeholders regarding its scope, enforcement, and potential impact on businesses and individuals. One of the most significant concerns with the Act is the absence of an independent regulatory body. Unlike the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union, which is enforced by independent data protection authorities, India's framework grants significant oversight to the government. This raises concerns about potential bias, lack of accountability, and the risk of political influence in enforcement actions. Without an autonomous authority to ensure impartiality, the enforcement of data protection laws may be inconsistent and susceptible to government intervention.

Section 18 of the Act permits the government to process personal data without user consent for reasons such as national security, public order, and other loosely defined "public interest" grounds. While national security considerations are vital, the broad scope of these exemptions raises fears of unchecked surveillance, data misuse, and potential violations of privacy rights. The lack of clear procedural safeguards, such as judicial oversight or independent review mechanisms, exacerbates concerns about government overreach. The Act lacks precise definitions for fundamental terms such as "public interest" and "reasonable security practices." The absence of clarity can lead to varied interpretations by businesses, regulatory bodies, and courts, resulting in inconsistent enforcement. This ambiguity also increases legal uncertainty for companies attempting to comply with the law, potentially leading to litigation and compliance difficulties.

The compliance requirements imposed by the Act may disproportionately affect small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Unlike large corporations that have extensive legal and financial resources, smaller businesses may struggle to implement the necessary data protection measures. The costs associated with appointing data protection officers, ensuring secure data storage, and maintaining compliance with evolving regulations could hinder the growth and innovation of startups and small enterprises. The Act mandates that sensitive personal data be stored within India, raising concerns about its impact on multinational corporations operating in the country. While data localization aims to enhance security and regulatory control, it imposes logistical and financial burdens on businesses that rely on global data flows. Restricting cross-border data transfers could deter foreign investment, limit technological potentially advancements. and lead to retaliatory trade measures from other nations.

A fundamental challenge in implementing the Act is the lack of public awareness regarding data protection rights. Many individuals remain uninformed about their rights under the new law, as well as the mechanisms available to enforce them. Without widespread digital literacy initiatives, users may not be able to exercise their rights effectively, weakening the impact of the legislation.

To address these challenges and ensure the Act achieves its intended objectives, several reforms and improvements should be considered, to ensure impartial and effective enforcement, the government should establish an independent regulatory body. This authority should function similarly to the European Data Protection Board under the GDPR, ensuring that data protection laws are enforced without undue governmental influence. An independent body would enhance accountability and boost public trust in the system. The broad exemptions granted to the government under Section 18 should be revised to introduce clear limitations. Data access by government agencies should be subject to judicial or independent oversight to prevent misuse. Implementing due process mechanisms will ensure that national security and public interest considerations do not override fundamental privacy rights.

The Act should provide explicit definitions for terms such as "public interest," "reasonable security practices," and "harm." This will minimize ambiguity, reduce the scope for misinterpretation, and promote consistency in enforcement across different sectors and businesses. Recognizing the financial and technical constraints of SMEs, the government should offer assistance programs to help smaller enterprises comply with data protection requirements. This could include financial subsidies, training programs, and simplified compliance frameworks that reduce regulatory burdens without compromising data security. While ensuring data security is crucial, a more balanced approach to data localization should be considered. Instead of a blanket requirement to store all sensitive data in India, the government could allow controlled crossborder data transfers with adequate safeguards, such as standard contractual clauses and international certifications.

The success of the Act depends on citizens understanding their rights and responsibilities. The government, in collaboration with civil society organizations, should launch awareness campaigns, conduct educational programs, and integrate data protection topics into school curricula to foster digital literacy from an early age. The Act should establish a transparent and accessible grievance redressal system. Individuals should have a straightforward process to report data breaches, file complaints, and seek redress. This mechanism should be efficient, user-friendly, and capable of holding organizations accountable for violations.

In conclusion, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, marks a significant milestone in India's digital privacy landscape. It aligns with global data protection trends and sets out to reinforce user rights while placing responsibilities on data fiduciaries. However, several concerns such as broad government exemptions, lack of independent oversight, and stringent data localization norms must be addressed to ensure the Act functions effectively without infringing on individual freedoms. To strike a balance between national security, economic growth, and personal privacy, India must adopt a flexible and transparent approach to data protection. Legislative amendments, regular reviews, and open policy discussions will be crucial in refining the Act. A collaborative effort involving the government, businesses, civil society, and the judiciary is necessary to build a robust, user-centric data privacy ecosystem.

By implementing the suggested reforms and addressing its current shortcomings, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, has the potential to serve as a comprehensive and future-proof framework. This will ensure that privacy remains a fundamental right in India's evolving digital economy, fostering trust, innovation, and responsible data governance.

REFERENCE

- Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., W.P. (C) No. 494 of 2012 (2017).
- [2] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., W.P. (C) No. 494 of 2012, Appendix - Order of the Court (2017).
- [3] S. Raju v. Gov't of India, W.P.(C) No. 439 of 2012 (Madras HC); Vickram Crishna v. UIDAI, PIL No. 10 of 2012 (Bombay HC); transferred to the Supreme Court, No. 439 of 2012 (SC, Sept. 23, 2013); Aruna Roy v. Union of India, W.P. No. 833 of 2013 (SC); S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India, W.P. No. 829 of 2013 (SC); Unique Identification Auth. of India v. Cent. Bureau of Investigation, SLP (Crl) No. 2524 of 2014 (SC).

- [4] Available at http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/FileServ er/2015-10-16_1444976434.pdf.
- [5] "Privacy Not a Fundamental Right, Argues Mukul Rohatgi for Govt as Govt Affidavit Says Otherwise", Legally India, http://www.legallyindia.com/home/privac y-not-a-fundamental-right-argues-mukulrohatgi-for-govt-as-govt-affidavit-saysotherwise-20150723-6332.
- [6] M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 30.
- [7] Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1295.
- [8] India Const. art. 21.
- [9] Gautam Bhatia, The Supreme Court's Right to Privacy Judgment - 1: Foundations, Indian Constitutional Law & Phil. Blog, https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2017 /08/27/the-supreme-courts-right-toprivacy-judgment-i-foundations.
- [10]Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225 (India)
- [11]France Coralie Mallis Anantar v. Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608 (India).
- [12] A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 AIR27, 1950 SCR 88 (India).
- [13] Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India & T.M. Gurubuxani v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564 (India).
- [14] Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2SCR 621 (India).
- [15] Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
- [16] India Const. art. 51(c)
- [17] India Const. art. 25.
- [18] India Const. art. 51(c)
- [19](1997) 1 S.C.C. 301 (India).
- [20] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
- [21] Universal Declaration of Human Rights art.12, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
- [22](1976) 1 S.C.R. 172 (India).