

# Reactive Alarmism to Proactive Resilience Harnessing AI and ML for India's Water Security

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**Abstract**—China's planned hydropower expansion on the Yarlung Tsangpo, which becomes the Brahmaputra in India, has raised concerns in New Delhi about ecological disruption, water scarcity, and strategic manipulation. The absence of a formal treaty between India and China amplifies India's vulnerability as a downstream riparian. This paper explores how Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) can provide India with predictive, surveillance, and decision-making tools that enhance resilience and offset information asymmetries. Drawing upon hydro-hegemony theory, Sino-Indian water dispute literature, and case studies of Brahmaputra basin politics, the study situates AI/ML as instruments of counter-hegemony within India's water-security strategy. The analysis highlights that AI/ML integration into hydrological forecasting, satellite surveillance, and hydro-economic modelling can reinforce India's bargaining capacity in transboundary water governance (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006, pp. 442) [1]; (Hayat, Gupta, Vegelin, & Jamali, 2022, pp. 1726) [2]

**Index Terms**—Artificial Intelligence (AI), Big Data Analytics in Hydrology, Brahmaputra River Basin, Climate Change Adaptation, Counter-Hegemony, Decision Support Systems (DSS), Geopolitics of Water, Hydro-Economic Modelling, Hydro-Hegemony, Hydrological Forecasting, India-China Water Dispute, Machine Learning (ML), Proactive Resilience Framework, Remote Sensing and Surveillance, Riverine Politics in South Asia, Sentiment Analysis in Diplomacy, Sino-Indian Relations, Strategic Resilience, Transboundary Water Governance, Water Security

## I. ABOUT THE AUTHORS

This paper is the result of an interdisciplinary collaboration among three co-authors, each bringing a distinct but complementary expertise to the study of political science and the application of Artificial Intelligence (AI).

The first author, Dr. Seema Sukhija, a senior academic and Ph.D. in Political Science, provides the overarching theoretical and policy framework of the paper. Her contribution ensures that the arguments remain firmly rooted in established traditions of international relations, security studies, and hydro-politics. By situating the Brahmaputra dispute within broader discourses of hydro-hegemony and regional power asymmetry, she establishes the political and strategic context that guides the analysis.

The second author, a doctoral researcher in Political Science, Mr. Anupam Singh, builds upon this foundation by conducting detailed case analyses, synthesizing contemporary scholarship, and interpreting the evolving dynamics of Sino-Indian water politics. His work extends the theoretical lens to specific empirical developments, including recent disputes, institutional responses, and India's policy vulnerabilities. Together, the first and second authors are responsible for the sections of the paper that engage directly with the political science literature, historical background, and strategic implications of transboundary water governance.

The third author, Mr. Chandras Batheja, a doctoral researcher specializing in Artificial Intelligence, contributes the technical and conceptual innovations

that distinguish this paper. His expertise lies in mapping AI and Machine Learning (ML) tools such as hydrological forecasting models, satellite-based monitoring systems, hydro-economic simulations, and AI-enabled sentiment analysis, onto the challenges identified by the political science framework. The third author has led the design of the conceptual framework that integrates AI/ML into water security and policy strategy, demonstrating how technological innovation can complement political analysis and counterbalance asymmetries in information and power.

This division of scope coupled with healthy collaboration reflects the inherently interdisciplinary character of the subject. While the political science perspective establishes the stakes and context of the Brahmaputra dispute, the AI/ML perspective opens pathways for novel, data-driven solutions. The collaboration therefore bridges theory and technology, offering both conceptual depth and strategic innovation.

## II. INTRODUCTION

The Brahmaputra River, originating as the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet, travels more than 2,800 kilometers across China, India, and Bangladesh before reaching the Bay of Bengal. Its course through the Great Bend in Tibet has made it central to regional geopolitics because of China's capacity to harness massive hydropower at the river's steep descent (Mahapatra & Ratha, 2016, pp. 91–93) [8]. Beijing's upstream control of transboundary rivers like the Brahmaputra/Yarlung Tsangpo, coupled with limited institutionalized cooperation, has made water a potential flashpoint in Sino-Indian relations.




Figure 1. The Brahmaputra River Basin. Source: Christopher (2013, p. 9) [3]

Unlike India's institutional arrangements with Pakistan under the Indus Waters Treaty or with Bangladesh under the Ganges Treaty, no comprehensive water-sharing agreement exists between India and China (Akanksha, 2023, p. 1463) [9]. This legal vacuum has heightened Indian perceptions of insecurity, particularly given past episodes where Beijing suspended data sharing during periods of political tension.

Scholarly assessments emphasize that water disputes between India and China are embedded within broader historical mistrust and territorial competition (Christopher, 2013, pp. 31) [3]. While some argue that outright "water wars" are unlikely, the securitization of rivers in South Asia where resource competition interacts with border disputes and climate pressures ensures that the Brahmaputra will remain a flashpoint (Sinha, 2016, pp. 142) [4]. This article situates AI/ML as a positive potential counter-hegemonic tool, allowing India to assert agency in an asymmetric relationship where China retains hydro-hegemony (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006, pp. 439–440) [1]; (Hayat et al., 2022, pp. 1726–1727) [2]

## III. CHINA'S DAM STRATEGY AND INDIA'S VULNERABILITIES

### 3.1 China's Hydro-Strategic Position

China's upstream location grants it decisive control over the Brahmaputra's headwaters, enabling it to shape downstream flow through dam construction and diversion. Zeitoun and Warner's (2006) hydro-hegemony framework identifies this as "resource capture" by virtue of geography and power (pp. 444) [1]. Hayat et al. (2022) further stress that such asymmetries intensify when upstream states deploy strategies of secrecy and unilateralism, which Beijing has frequently pursued in its Brahmaputra projects (pp. 1726) [2].

Beijing's pursuit of hydropower on the Yarlung Tsangpo is motivated by energy demand and water scarcity in northern China, but it also serves geopolitical ends. As Chellaney (2013) observes, dam-building on transboundary rivers has become a tool of strategic dominance, allowing China to exert leverage over downstream states (pp. 180) [5]. Christopher (2013) situates this within a broader global pattern where water is securitized as both a resource and an

instrument of power, with South Asia providing multiple examples of such conflicts (pp. 18) [3]

### 3.2 India's Strategic Vulnerabilities

India's vulnerabilities derive from both geography and institutional gaps. The Brahmaputra basin, particularly Assam, is prone to extreme flooding and sedimentation, making downstream communities acutely sensitive to upstream manipulations (Mahapatra & Ratha, 2016, pp. 94–96) [8]. Chellaney (2013) warns that reductions in lean-season flows could undermine agricultural productivity and hydropower potential in northeast India, while artificial releases might exacerbate downstream flooding (pp. 93, 181) [5].

The withholding of hydrological data during the 2017 Doklam standoff illustrated the risks of opacity (Akanksha, 2023, p. 4) [9]. Holslag (2011) emphasizes that while India's alarmist narratives of "water wars" may sometimes exaggerate risks, they reflect a deep structural mistrust of China's intentions (pp. 22–24) [6]. Sinha (2016) characterizes India and China as "contrasting riparians" one wielding upstream dominance, the other downstream vulnerability which sets the stage for both competition and reluctant cooperation (pp. 116–118) [4].

Table 1 and Table 2 below, adapted from Sinha (2016, p. 39), illustrate the comparative riparian relations in South Asia, highlighting the interdependencies and structural vulnerabilities that frame India's position in the Brahmaputra basin.

**Table 1: Indus Basin**

|                         |                                    |
|-------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Total Basin Area        | 1170838 km <sup>2</sup>            |
| Annual Available waters | 224 billion metric <sup>3</sup>    |
| <i>Country</i>          | <i>Basin Area (Km<sup>2</sup>)</i> |
| Pakistan                | 632,954                            |
| India                   | 374,887                            |
| China                   | 86,432                             |
| Afghanistan             | 76,542                             |

*Source: Freshwater Under Threat: South Asia, UNEP Report, 2008 [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/ASAZ-7NZJEX/\\$file/unep\\_Dec2008.pdf?openelement](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/ASAZ-7NZJEX/$file/unep_Dec2008.pdf?openelement). P26*

**Table 2: Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin**

|                         |                                     |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Total Basin Area        | 1745000 km <sup>2</sup>             |
| Annual Available Waters | 2,025 billion metric m <sup>3</sup> |
| <i>Country</i>          | <i>Basin Area (Km<sup>2</sup>)</i>  |
| India                   | 1,105,000 (62.9 per cent)           |
| China                   | 326,000 (19.1 per cent)             |
| Nepal                   | 140,000 (8.0 per cent)              |
| Bangladesh              | 129,000 (7.4 per cent)              |
| Bhutan                  | 45,000 (2.6 per cent)               |

*Source: Freshwater Under Threat: South Asia, UNEP Report, 2008 [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/ASAZ-7NZJEX/\\$file/unep\\_Dec2008.pdf?openelement](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/ASAZ-7NZJEX/$file/unep_Dec2008.pdf?openelement), p. 26.*

Zhao, Zhao, Xiong, and Sun (2023) provide empirical evidence that climate imperatives can serve as catalysts for cooperation in the basin, but warn that without attention to ecological protection, unilateralism will heighten conflict potential (pp.

1227–1229) [7]. Thus, India's challenge lies not only in preparing for hydrological risks but also in rebalancing power through innovative strategies such as AI/ML-enabled monitoring, forecasting, and decision support.

#### IV. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: HYDRO-HEGEMONY AND COUNTER-HEGEMONY

##### 4.1 Hydro-Hegemony in Theory

The concept of hydro-hegemony, advanced by Zeitoun and Warner (2006), provides a robust theoretical lens to examine the Brahmaputra dispute. Their framework highlights how asymmetries in power military, economic, technological, and geographic determine riparian relations. Hydro-hegemons can exert dominance not only through physical control of water flows but also via discursive framing and institutional manipulation (pp. 439–441) [1].

Hayat, Gupta, Vegelin, and Jamali (2022) expand this discussion by emphasizing how the theory has evolved to incorporate counter-hegemonic strategies, including resistance within and across states. They point out that transboundary governance cannot be understood without factoring in asymmetric power relations, variable intensities of conflict, and the strategic use of location by riparian states (pp. 1725–1727) [2]. In this framework, China exemplifies the hydro-hegemon in the Brahmaputra Basin, leveraging its upstream advantage and infrastructural dominance.

##### 4.2 Sino-Indian Hydro politics

The Brahmaputra dispute cannot be separated from the broader political tensions between India and China. Holslag (2011) observes that India perceives China's control over Tibet as a strategic threat because the plateau is both a geographic fortress and a source of vital rivers. From New Delhi's perspective, infrastructure development on the plateau has always carried implications beyond hydropower, extending into national security (pp. 22–24) [6].

Christopher (2013), in his U.S. Naval War College study, situates the Brahmaputra within a wider trend of water securitization, where disputes over water access are increasingly viewed through the prism of conflict and instability. He underscores how incidents across Asia and Africa between 2010 and 2013 demonstrate that water scarcity and manipulation frequently trigger political crises (pp. 4–5) [3].

Sinha (2016) adds that while transboundary rivers like the Brahmaputra create interdependencies, they are often politicized in ways that entrench mistrust. He notes that in South Asia, cooperation and competition coexist, as no state can afford absolute hostility nor full reliance on trust (pp. 117–118) [4]. Chellaney (2013)

reinforces this by describing water as a “weapon of leverage” in Chinese strategy, framing it as a long-term geopolitical tool in Sino-Indian relations (pp. 113–115) [5].

##### 4.3 Counter-Hegemony through Technology and Diplomacy

Counter-hegemony arises when weaker riparians develop mechanisms to resist or balance hegemonic control. Zeitoun and Warner (2006) argue that such resistance can be material through dam construction or military deterrence or discursive, by reframing the narrative of rights and equity in water allocation (pp. 442–443) [1].

Hayat et al. (2022) stress that counter-hegemonic strategies increasingly involve innovative governance mechanisms and technology, rather than solely physical infrastructure (pp. 1728–1729) [2]. In the case of India, AI and ML provide an opportunity to exercise counter-hegemony by reducing dependency on Chinese hydrological disclosures, strengthening independent monitoring, and amplifying India's narrative of equity in international forums.

Zhao, Zhao, Xiong, and Sun (2023) further highlight that climate imperatives in the Brahmaputra Basin create both risks and opportunities. While ecological degradation and shifting monsoons may exacerbate conflict, they also open space for cooperation around shared adaptation goals (pp. 1227–1229) [7]. India's counter-hegemonic use of AI/ML could be positioned not just as defensive but also as a cooperative instrument, contributing to climate adaptation strategies that include both China and Bangladesh

#### V. AI/ML APPLICATIONS FOR INDIA'S WATER SECURITY

##### 5.1 Hydrological Forecasting

Flood forecasting and flow prediction remain central to managing the Brahmaputra's volatility. AI techniques, particularly deep learning models, can integrate satellite rainfall data, snowmelt indices, and historical discharge patterns to produce reliable short-term and long-term forecasts. This becomes critical in contexts where China has withheld hydrological data during political crises, such as in 2017 (pp. 1238) [7]. By building independent forecasting systems, India reduces its vulnerability to strategic opacity.

Holslag (2011) points out that much of India's insecurity stems not from proven diversions but from uncertainty about Chinese intentions (pp. 22–23) [6]. AI-based models that reduce uncertainty can therefore mitigate alarmist narratives and strengthen confidence in decision-making. Zhao, Zhao, Xiong, and Sun (2023) also demonstrate, through their event-dataset analysis, that many disputes could be managed through better predictive systems that anticipate climate-related risks and variability (pp. 1227, 1229) [7].

## 5.2 Remote Sensing and Surveillance

Machine learning applied to remote-sensing imagery can monitor Chinese construction activity at the Great Bend and other Tibetan dam sites. By analysing multispectral and SAR imagery, India can track changes in land use, water impoundments, and possible diversion activity.

Chellaney (2013) emphasizes that Beijing's projects are often framed as harmless "run-of-the-river" dams, but downstream impacts can be severe, particularly on sediment transport (pp. 239) [5]. Sinha (2016) highlights the significance of geography, noting that rivers crossing political boundaries create interdependencies that can either reinforce cooperation or intensify conflict (pp. 117–118) [4]. AI-enhanced satellite monitoring gives India the ability to contest Chinese narratives with evidence-based assessments in diplomatic forums.

## 5.3 Hydro-Economic Modelling

The economic implications of altered flows in the Brahmaputra basin are substantial. AI-driven hydro-economic models can simulate scenarios for agriculture, fisheries, and hydropower. These tools help policymakers quantify costs under different conditions: Chinese water retention during lean seasons, sudden releases, or climate-change-induced droughts.

Mahapatra and Ratha (2016) emphasize that Assam's economy is highly sensitive to fluctuations in flow and sediment, making it critical to forecast impacts on agriculture and livelihoods (pp. 94–96) [8]. Zhao et al. (2023) also argue that climate and energy imperatives, while potential triggers of conflict, can paradoxically serve as incentives for cooperative basin management if impacts are transparently modelled (pp. 1228–1229) [7].

By using AI to quantify these scenarios, India gains leverage in international negotiations, demonstrating both vulnerability and the need for equitable basin management

## 5.4 Sentiment Analysis and Strategic Communication

AI-based sentiment analysis tools can track narratives in regional and international media about the Brahmaputra. By analyzing news coverage, social media, and policy documents, Indian policymakers can identify when alarmism peaks, when cooperative openings emerge, and how China frames its projects globally.

Securitization of water often spreads through narratives as much as through material changes. Holslag (2011) adds that Indian fears are partly constructed through media amplification of Chinese dam-building (pp. 22–24) [6]. By monitoring and countering such narratives, India can better calibrate its diplomatic engagement and mobilize global opinion.

Hayat, Gupta, Vegelin, and Jamali (2022) also stress the importance of discursive power in hydro-hegemony, where framing water issues in particular ways can either reinforce or contest hegemonic dominance (pp. 1728–1729) [2]. AI-enhanced sentiment analysis thus becomes a form of counter-hegemonic strategy.

## 5.5 Decision Support Systems for Hydro-Diplomacy

AI-enabled decision-support systems can integrate hydrological, economic, and political variables into scenario simulations. These platforms allow policymakers to weigh trade-offs between different strategies: accelerating India's Upper Siang project, investing in basin-wide adaptation, or pursuing treaty negotiations.

Zeitoun and Warner (2006) note that counter-hegemony often requires downstream states to innovate in institutional and strategic responses (pp. 442–443) [1]. Chellaney (2013) similarly argues that India must adopt good policies and practices for long-term and strategic management of water resources. (pp. 279) [5]. Decision-support systems that bring together multiple dimensions of risk can enable India to plan proactively, reducing its dependence on reactive crisis management.

## VI. SUGGESTED MEASURES TOWARDS A PROACTIVE APPROACH

### 6.1 Establish an AI-Enabled Brahmaputra Monitoring Mission

India should establish a centralized monitoring mission that integrates satellite imagery, AI-based hydrological modelling, and big-data analytics to independently verify Chinese activities. Independent monitoring is essential to counter upstream opacity. Riparian interdependencies are inherently political, and India must leverage technological sovereignty to contest unilateral practices.

### 6.2 Develop Open Data Platforms with AI Verification

India and Bangladesh could collaborate on a basin-wide open data platform, enhanced by AI verification, to reduce dependence on Chinese data. China has repeatedly suspended data sharing during diplomatic disputes, leaving downstream states vulnerable. Counter-hegemony requires institutional innovations that redistribute knowledge asymmetries.

### 6.3 Leverage AI for Strategic Diplomacy

AI-enhanced sentiment analysis should be incorporated into foreign-policy strategy, allowing India to track media narratives and global discourse around the Brahmaputra. Securitization emerges as much from narratives as from material realities. Indian insecurity is amplified by perceptions, which China can strategically exploit.

### 6.4 AI-Augmented Scenario Planning

Hydro-economic models powered by AI should be used to simulate the costs of unilateralism and benefits of cooperation. Climate change is a dual-edged driver it can intensify disputes or provide openings for cooperation, depending on institutional preparedness. Assam's economy is highly exposed to upstream activities, making such modelling indispensable for planning

### 6.5 Community-Level AI for Adaptation

Beyond national policy, AI can empower local communities in Assam by providing crop forecasts, flood warnings, and adaptive farming strategies. Grassroots vulnerability amplifies national insecurity, as ecological degradation weakens India's bargaining

position. Riverine politics are shaped as much by local adaptation as by elite diplomacy

## VII. CONCLUSION

The Brahmaputra dispute exemplifies the convergence of hydrology, geopolitics, and technology. China's upstream hydro-hegemony, reinforced by its dam-building spree, magnifies India's vulnerabilities as a downstream riparian. While some scholars, such as Holslag (2011), argue that outright "water wars" are apparently amplified (pp. 22–24) [6], others emphasize that securitization ensures persistent tensions (Christopher, 2013, pp. 26) [3].

India's challenge is hence, to shift from reactive alarmism to proactive resilience. By embedding AI and ML into hydrological forecasting, remote sensing, economic modelling, and diplomatic strategy, India can contest information asymmetries and assert counter-hegemony. This technological empowerment does not preclude cooperation; indeed, Zhao et al. (2023) argue that climate change necessitates collaborative adaptation, which AI can facilitate (pp. 1227–1229) [7].

Ultimately, AI/ML integration offers India the dual advantage of strengthening domestic preparedness and enhancing international leverage. By reframing technology as both a defensive and cooperative instrument, India can transform the Brahmaputra dispute from a source of vulnerability into an arena for strategic resilience and innovation.

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