

# Redefining the Parameters of Democracy in Multicultural Societies: Communitarian and Liberal Perspective in India

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**Abstract**—Redefining the parameters of democracy in multicultural societies in India primarily involves adapting traditional democratic principles to accommodate diverse cultural identities while ensuring equal rights and opportunities for all citizens, moving beyond simple formal equality. The goal is to foster national unity and social stability by integrating diverse groups into national life without demanding assimilation. India's approach to multicultural democracy is rooted in its Constitution, which established a secular and pluralistic framework. Key parameters include secularism where state maintains neutrality and tolerance towards all religions a core principle that treats all communities equally and ensures no state religion, fundamental rights which guarantees fundamental rights to all citizens, including the right to equality (Article 14) and the prohibition of discrimination (Article 15), minority rights in provisions (Articles 25-30) protect the interests of religious and linguistic minorities, giving them the right to conserve their distinct culture, language, and script, and to establish and administer their own educational institutions, federalism the state structure accommodates regional, linguistic, and cultural differences by granting significant autonomy to states, allowing for the management of local diversity within a larger, unified framework, affirmative action includes policies like reservations in legislatures, government jobs, and educational institutions for marginalized groups (Scheduled Castes and Tribes) ensure their representation and address historical injustices. India's democratic success in managing immense diversity has been unique, but its continued resilience depends on how effectively these challenges are addressed through inclusive governance, strong institutional frameworks, and a sustained commitment to core democratic values of justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity.

**Index Terms**—Multicultural, Democracy, Community, Liberal, Communitarian, Cultures, Unequal.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Politics involving affirmative action made social identity such as race, caste and gender a relevant and significant factor in democracy. While the struggle for political equality had sought to minimize and even neutralize the influence of these attributes, the affirmative action programme made them the bases of differentiating between citizens and granting special consideration to some. The affirmative action programme gave weightage to community identities and group membership for the purpose of undoing the harm that had been done to these groups over centuries by the rest of society. In other words, it did not privilege community identities for the role they play in the formation of personal identity, nor did it speak of the intrinsic value of these identities. Both communitarian critics of liberalism as well as liberal defenders of minority rights redefine the discourse of democracy by placing a positive value on community identity. The writings of Michael Sandal and Will Kymlicka reflect the difference. Collectively they represent the new ways in which community identities have been introduced and given legitimate space within the discourse of democracy. Policies of affirmative action made community membership a relevant factor in the distribution of public goods. However, such consideration was supposed to be given for a limited period. That is, it was introduced as a temporary measure and justified on the same basis. Moreover, it was seen as a deviation from the general norm of formal equality and colour-blindness, one that was necessary under the circumstances to counter the effects of historical subordination and existing social prejudices. As such these policies were part of the

wider concern for a just and fair society, and were often upheld with reference to the principles of justice.

## II. THE DISTINCTIVENESS IDEA OF MICHAEL SANDEL

The distinctiveness of Michael Sandel's communitarian perspective is that it questions the centrality accorded to the principles of justice and individual rights in the liberal framework. While underlining the role of community in constituting the self, he maintains that the principles of justice have limited relevance in social institutions. In fact, these conceptions have no place in the family and other such institutions. Sandel makes two arguments in this regard.

First, he suggests that individual subjects are constituted by the communities to which they belong. Every individual is a member of a family, religion, tribe, race, and nation. As such he has a history and is placed in specific social circumstances<sup>1</sup>. The attachments and the moral engagement that emerge from these community memberships determine 'who I am.' They shape the 'values, they go beyond the obligations and natural duties (Sandel,1984:90). In other words, social predicaments, involvements, and ways of living are not chosen by individual subjects: instead, they find themselves in them by virtue of their community memberships. Further cultural community membership gives individuals their identity: without them individuals would have no moral depth or character (Sandel,1984:87). Since 'who I am' and 'what I value,' are both shaped by community membership, the latter is significant and cannot be set aside in political or public life. In fact, a democracy must be sensitive to community identities (ibid:86). It must consider cultural membership to be a valued good that needs to be preserved and protected<sup>2</sup>.

Second, members of a community have a sense of commonality and sharing with others. A sense of 'mutual indebtedness and moral engagement' pervades the life of the community and principles of justice and conceptions of individual rights have limited place within it. Following Hume's analysis, Sandel maintains that 'in so far as mutual benevolence and enlarged affections could be cultivated more widely, the need for the cautious, jealous virtue of justice would diminish in proportion, and mankind would be better off for it (Sandel,1982:101). For

Sandel then, justice becomes the first principle of social institutions only when generosity and benevolence are absent. And if sentiments of community and fellowship were strong, justice would be scarcely engaged in.

In Sandel's communitarian perspective, community is a valued good. It represents a form of moral engagement which is governed by principles quite distinct from those that are cherished by liberals. On both counts, a community's way of life is worthy of protection and preservation: it needs to be sheltered from external intervention and it must not be judged by the criteria of individual rights or principles of justice and fairness.

## III. WILL KYMLICKA'S CONCEPT OF CULTURAL COMMUNITY

Will Kymlicka reaffirms this conclusion albeit by appealing to liberal values. Distancing himself from communitarians albeit by appealing to liberal values. Distancing himself from communitarians, he argues that individuals are members of a political community as well as cultural community. They have, in a manner of speaking, dual citizenship on one hand they are fellow citizens and on the other, they are members of a community who share a culture, language and history. Often the boundaries of these communities – political and cultural do not overlap. People with different cultures, languages and histories may live within the same political community. From Kymlicka's perspective, the main problem with liberalism is that it pays insufficient attention to cultural community. By incorporating people universally through a colour-blind criterion, it neglects their cultural allegiances and rights – an aspect that places the minority cultures within the nation-state at a disadvantage (Kymlicka,1995:35).

Kymlicka uses the idea of dual membership to argue that people are owed respect as citizens as well as members of a cultural community. And what it perhaps more important is that in culturally plural societies citizenship rights are often insufficient for realizing this end. While they grant political equality to all members, they do not always respect cultural values as a primary good. This places cultural communities at a disadvantage because they are expected to change and conform to the 'universal' mode prescribed by the state. Moreover, ignoring cultural affiliations and

treating all subjects as equal citizens with the same rights also enhances the vulnerability of minority cultures. The right to move freely settle anywhere and buy or sell property could for instance result in the disintegration of the Indian -American community. Under the circumstances, preserving the Indian way of life requires that land rights of the community be protected and correspondingly, the mobility of outsiders and access to community land be severely restricted. In other words, protecting cultural community from disintegration and acknowledging the value of cultural membership may require special rights for the minorities and a system of differential rights for citizens. Restricting the rights of some individuals may be necessary for protecting and respecting dual community membership.

Preserving a cultural community from possible disintegration is regarded to be essential for two reasons. First, cultural membership is a valued good in and by itself. Second, it enhances the value that liberal's favour most – namely the right to choose. Each culture, for Kymlicka, represents a way of life, it offers a specific model of social life and organization that we may in time come to endorse. As such preserving diverse cultures increases the number of available options from among which we can choose our own way of life. If cultural diversity were to disappear, then there would be no concrete options left which humankind could explore. Under these circumstances freedom of choice would be meaningless. Liberals therefore need to be concerned about the fate of cultural structures, more than all else they need to realize that only by having a rich and secure cultural structure, people can become aware, in a vivid way of the options available to them and intelligibly examine their value (Kymlicka,1991,165). While arguing that liberals must be concerned about the fate of cultures in society, Kymlicka also suggests that group rights are not always incompatible with the ideals of liberalism. Since liberals defend the right to individual conscience and not merely collective worship, they can object to situations where a community places restrictions upon its members and suppresses internal difference and dissent. But there is no reason why liberals should be unsympathetic to demands of national minorities that seek protection against the policies of the state or the societal majority<sup>3</sup>. To take an example the demand of the national minorities for self-governance or the

establishment of reserved land to protect against the power of the rest of society to buy out or expropriate indigenous or tribal land, does not generally entail a violation of the basic civil and political rights of the people of the community. It may limit the liberty of the individual members to some extent but it would not subject different sections of the community population to unequal treatment. Consequently, rights of this kind, involving external protection for national or ethnic minorities need not be described as illiberal and can be justified within the framework of liberal theory itself. Thus, both Kymlicka and Sandel, unlike proponents of affirmative action, underline the value of cultural membership. Although they approach this from two quite different perspectives, each of them claims cultural membership to be a primary good that must be protected. Sandel maintains that membership of a community entails a form of relationship in which principles of justice and issues of individual rights have limited applicability. Kymlicka on the other hand, does not dispense with liberal conception of justice. Instead, he gives a new direction to liberal theory by arguing that the liberal commitment to diversity and the democratic concern for equal treatment necessitate the protection of the rights of minority communities. Giving these cultures the same freedom and opportunity to plan their life in accordance with their beliefs, liberals should be willing to support these demands for self-governance, separate representation and polyethnic rights that seek to protect specific religious and cultural practices that are not adequately protected through the open market.

#### IV. PRESERVING CULTURES: INTERROGATING THE IDEALS OF MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY

The merit of Kymlicka's analysis is that it draws attention to the fact that seemingly neutral policies of the state reflect a cultural orientation, and this often places minority cultures at a disadvantage (Parekh,1994:23 and Tamir,1993:67)<sup>4</sup>. At times they even encourage the disintegration of these communities. However, he does not merely suggest that multicultural societies should adopt policies that do not place minority cultures at a disadvantage. Instead, he argues that diverse cultural ways of life must be preserved and protected, even when they

involve restrictions on the rights of some individuals, and it is this that poses serious difficulties.

Obviously, cultures can be maintained in their pure and pristine form only when they are sheltered from change both from external as well as internal sources. That is, a way of life must be protected against intervention by the state or individuals outside the community. Kymlicka recognizes this, and accordingly suggests that when Pueblos marry outside their community, they must relinquish their rights over land and live outside the community<sup>5</sup>. However, by sheltering the cultural community artificially from the winds of change, it treats a culture community artificially from the winds of change, it treats a culture like an ossified museum piece rather than a lived entity that is continuously being constituted and shaped by the actions of its individuals.

More importantly, this conception of cultural community invariably privileges the voice of conservative elements within the community. By treating the community as a homogeneous unit, embodying a set of shared values, it neglects differences within the community and almost entirely ignores the voices of dissent within. Although in western democracies the demand for cultural rights has been placed on the agenda much after equal rights have been granted to all categories of citizens, several groups, including women, have been extremely critical of the sanctity that is being accorded to cultural communities. In fact, it is often feared that giving priority to cultural practices would only serve the interest of the indigenous elite and jeopardize equality of different individuals within the community. In societies like India, where women still occupy a subordinate position, it is apparent that this structure of authority is being sanctioned by law on the grounds that community practices must be protected and not interfered with. As such, preserving cultural communities and cultural practices has meant strengthening the orthodox community leadership and silencing voices of dissent.

Kymlicka wishes to preserve cultures and their diverse ways of life for the sake of ensuring that the present and future generations have the right to choose between concrete alternatives. However the paradox is that in the interest of preserving options for humankind, he does not allow existing members of the community to explore other options and exercise their freedom of choice. Indeed, his suggestion that those

who do not endorse the practices of the community should be willing to abandon their community membership, places too high a price on the exercise of choice. Besides, it is questionable whether a culture which is to remain closed and insulated would ever allow outsiders to join it to explore the alternative way of life it represents. It is equally doubtful that people living in societies that have different communities occupying discrete pockets, would venture to explore alternative ways of life.

It is indeed desirable to have secure cultural structures, not because they are repositories of diverse ways of life but because they allow people of that community to distance themselves from and reflect upon their inheritances. If a cultural community is being marginalized or disadvantaged, it is exceedingly difficult for its members to have a reflective distance. Since identities are articulated and shaped in response to a specific context, a hostile context is more likely to encourage attempts to construct a fixed identity based on which the community can be distinguished sharply from its 'other.' In addition, it is likely to make the members of the community more insular and less open to difference.

Preserving cultural structures and practices by designating these communities as minorities is also unlikely to render any assistance in this direction. In fact, it may reaffirm the feeling of being marginalized and underline the need for greater solidarity among the community (Gray,1988:43). Under these conditions, members are inclined to be dogmatic about upholding cultural practices and less willing to create space for the expression of difference within.

Theorists of multiculturalism are not always indifferent to the question of internal difference and equality. Indeed, they distinguish between different kinds of communities and diverse demands for collective rights. Discussing these different demands Kymlicka case-by-case basis, in the light of the history of a group, its status in the larger society, and the choices and circumstances of its members (Kymlicka,1995:131). However, he eventually gives greater priority to the ideals of cultural diversity and preservation of diverse ways of life. Two problems arise because of this. One, he neglects the fact that communities are not homogeneous entities and the spirit of sharing and commonality that is embodied in them is not free of internal contradictions and conflicts of power. Two, the emphasis on preservation of

diverse cultures and plurality makes the question of inter-group equality the crucial determinant of democratic life and pushes the issue of intra group equality in the background. Kymlicka is not insensitive to the issue of intragroup equality, but he seems to regard cultural diversity as the primary value and desired public good, and leaves everything else open to negotiation. Speaking of situations where collective rights conflict with individual rights, he says, 'In these cases, the initial moral judgement is clear enough. From the liberal point of view, someone's rights are being unjustly denied by their government. But what is not clear is the proper remedy – that is what third party has the authority to intervene to force the government to respect those rights (Kymlicka,1995:165)? Since liberals today are reluctant to interfere in the affairs of other countries, even those that are illiberal, there is little justification for imposing the liberal way of life on groups within the country. The distinction between a country that is liberal and a self-governing national minority that is illiberal within a single country is, for him, untenable, Kymlicka is equally reluctant to authorize the federal Supreme Court to intervene in disputes between collective community practices and individual rights. He favours instead an internal review, appeal to international courts or some other 'consensual' way of strengthening mechanisms that respect individual rights (ibid:169). In all this, individual rights remain a subject of negotiation: they are issues on which moral pressure could be placed upon community members. But in the final analysis, the existence of individual rights is entirely dependent upon community practices. There are, in this sense, no limits on cultural diversity and relatively speaking, little value is attached to the protection of individual rights.

#### V. IS INTER-GROUP EQUALITY ENOUGH?

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, individual rights were closely associated with democracy, indeed they represented the essential condition of democratic governance. All through this time, marginalized and oppressed groups such as non-propertied classes, ethnic minorities and women, used the concept of individual rights in their struggle for equality and justice. That is these groups saw individual rights as a potential ally. Most of them demanded that the fundamental rights hitherto granted to the white, male

population in society should be extended to include them as well. In other words, even marginalized sections and minorities expressed their claims in the language of rights and they used this concept to question existing prejudices as well as to overcome legal impediments that hindered their recognition as equal citizens.

However, when equal civil and political rights have been granted to diverse categories of citizens, the value and relevance of individual rights have become an object of considerable debate and dispute. Objections have been raised on three grounds – first being the right based conceptions are state centred and ridden with internal contradictions. Within this framework demands are addressed to the state even when rights are claimed against the patriarchal state, they are expected to be protected by the institutions of the state (Mackinnon,1983:89). Further there can be and often are, conflicts between rights e.g. the right to choice can be used to defend abortions and, in this form, it conflicts with the right to life of the unborn children. In all such instances the concept of right is unable to furnish firm foundations through which internal conflicts can be resolved<sup>6</sup>. Second, the concept of rights emphasizes formal equality and invokes the notion of abstract individualism, assuming 'sameness is and visualizing the interchangeability of individuals (Wolgast,1980:12). In the process it loses sight of relevant differences between individuals that necessitate different treatment. Besides, it sees the individual only as a citizen of the polity and ignores all other forms of personal identity. Since it is unable to take cognizance of the diverse location of identity, it is unable to understand the complexity of social and political life. Lastly, the concept of individual rights is by itself inadequate and insufficient for protecting the interests of a variety of groups and communities in society. It ignores people who are long term residents but not citizens e.g. migrant labour from another country. And as was observed earlier, advocates of multiculturalism point out that it is unable to protect the interests of indigenous populations that have a culturally distinct way of life. Individual rights are, in this view, insufficient for protecting diverse culturally valued goods, in fact free, unrestrained exercise of individual rights could destroy indigenous cultures and communities.

The point that needs to be underlined is that these critiques of the concept of individual rights have come

from western democracies at a time when the language of rights and individual autonomy has taken deep root in these societies and law. To put it a little differently, once equal status, treatment and rights have been granted to almost all categories of citizens, the notion of individual rights is being considered inadequate and insufficient by the communities for realizing their new goals and tasks. In its place, conceptions of duty, sharing and benevolence are being invoked to evolve non-statist, local communitarian forms of social and political life. To some extent, community and the local context is no longer viewed as being oppressive or hostile because these individuals have equal rights and are, therefore, able to enter new communities as equals. However, in contexts where structures of discrimination within the community have not been successfully dismantled and some groups continue to be treated unequally in civil life, communitarian and collectivist forms of life raise considerable concern and anxiety. Indeed, in such conditions the relevance of the individual rights remains undisputed.

The historical juncture at which critiques of right based theories have emerged is significant for another associated reason. It shows that in western democracies, the issue of inter group equality has been placed on the agenda after the question of intra-group equality has been addressed. That is, treating all individuals as equals in social and political life enabled the dissolution of structured domination and oppression within society as well as the community. Equal status granted through the system of individual rights empowered the individual vis-à-vis the state, society, and community. Community is being considered as a valued good after the individual has gained a relative degree of autonomy apropos the community. In other words, when the community is no longer an oppressive structure embodying inequality, the demand for preserving cultures and their practices has gained considerable attention and legitimacy in these societies.

Distinctions and differences come to be valued positively when they are no longer associated with hierarchical forms of organization. So long as differences are the basis of ranking groups and justifying the distribution of unequal privileges, differences are met with suspicion with liberalism. However, when the existing pattern of social stratification, based on race or ethnicity is destroyed it is possible for democratic societies to recognize and

value differences. So long as there is the fear that social and cultural differences may be used to justify discrimination and social inequality, valuing distinctions and different treatment remains problematic within a democracy.

In western liberal politics, community practices were sought to be preserved after uniform laws, based on the principle of formal equality, had been extended to almost all communities. In India, however, community practices were sought to be preserved even before the inequalities already existing within communities had been eliminated. The value accorded cultural; diversity along with the concern for equality among communities sheltered communities from such interrogation. Indeed, these priorities privileged the community and made collective community rights rather than individual rights, the overriding concern of Indian democracy.

## VI. CONCLUSION

The experience of democracies in general, and in India in particular shows that individual rights are and have been, a primary instrument of democratization. Hence, these rights may be justifiably curtailed inly in pursuit of the essential ideals of democracy namely non-discrimination. When the exercise of individual rights continuously and systematically disadvantages a specific group in society, then it would be reasonable to place restrictions upon their use. Conversely, group rights may be accommodated within the framework of democracy when they are aimed at countering social patterns of discrimination.

Current discussions and challenges suggest a need for redefining certain parameters to address contemporary issues:

- **Balancing Group and Individual Rights:** A critical area involves ensuring that the protection of group rights (e.g., personal laws) does not infringe upon the fundamental individual rights of members within those groups, especially concerning gender equality and intra-group justice.
- **Ensuring Substantive Equality:** Moving beyond formal legal equality to address deep-rooted socio-economic inequalities, poverty, and discrimination faced by minority and marginalized communities is crucial for genuine democratic participation.

- **Combating Communalism and Identity Politics:** Political exploitation of religious and caste identities (communalism and casteism) remains a major threat to social harmony and national integration. Redefining parameters would involve stricter mechanisms to curb identity-based conflicts and promote inclusive political discourse.
- **Promoting Social Integration (Social Spontaneity):** The need for a non-coercive social integration that encourages communities to live together and participate as equal partners in national life, rather than existing as isolated cultural "islands.
- **Strengthening Inclusive Representation:** Ensuring equitable representation and participation of all citizens, particularly women and underrepresented groups, in decision-making processes at all levels of governance.
- **Adapting to New Challenges:** The democratic framework must continuously adapt to modern challenges such as the digital divide, misinformation in media, and economic disparities that can exacerbate social divisions.

The emphasis on cultural diversity foregrounded the community within Indian democracy. Further, since this ideal was pursued before equality had been established in civil life, it has resulted in the preservation of existing cultural practices, including those that discriminate against one section of the population. Because of this reordering of priorities, the concern for inter-group equality has hindered the realization of intra-group inequality. Indeed, it must be continued subordination of women as a group. Under this circumstance of prevailing intra-group equality, the universalizing logic of individual rights retains its democratic potential. These rights allow the individual to question and dislodge the formal and informal structures of power in society. For this reason, the framework of individual rights provides a safeguard against systematic subordination and oppression of groups in society. Even though culture is the context in which individuals live act and define themselves, preserving cultures is insufficient ground for limiting individual rights. The experience of India reveals that valuing diversity for its own sake results in fission and not fusion. If individual rights are said to produce atomized, disinterested individuals, valuing cultural diversity by itself may produce non-compromising

groups and communities. That is, contrary to the perceptions of communitarians, cultural diversity is not likely to generate the politics of 'common good'. As more groups seek separate status on grounds of their cultural distinctiveness, communities are likely to be more exclusivist. As lines of inclusion and exclusion get more rigidly drawn, the space for commonality is likely to decrease. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to envisage high measure of mutual engagement in society. Democracies must be concerned about the possibility of groups being excluded or disadvantaged by societal practices. Accordingly special consideration or collective group rights may need to be granted in pursuit of the ideal of non-discrimination. Group rights of this nature have a legitimate space within democracy, but all other considerations for collective rights remain suspect within this framework.

#### REFERENCE

- [1] Sandel recognizes that individuals have multiple identities as they are members of several communities. For instance, a person is a member of a family, race, region, gender, and nation. Each of these represents distinct identities that do not overlap. Hence, all that can be said is that the self is socially situated. Being constituted by a community or several communities only indicates that the individual is not entirely free of its inheritances. Moreover, for Sandel, members of a community do not always share the same ends. In fact, people within the same community have different ambitions and desires. Consequently, what binds them together is the performance of certain cultural practices. Since practices define a way of life and unite the community, forging a moral unity in the form of a nation-state also requires commitment to a shared world view and cultural practices. Paradoxically enough, the centrality accorded to shared or common cultural practices eventually leads Sandel to defend a culturally homogenous state rather than a multicultural state.  
Sandel, Michael, 1982, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- [2] While emphasizing the value of community, Sandel also offers a critique of liberalism. In this view, liberalism lacks a principle of sharing. It has

no conception of community. Although individuals are free to voluntarily join in association with others, cooperation of this kind overrules the possibility of membership in any community bound by moral ties antecedent to choice. As such, the liberal conception of the individual excludes membership of any community that is constitutive. That is, it does not see anyone as fellow participants in a way of life instead it perceives them as others who are external and distinct from, he self. Besides representing the individual as a wholly independent subject, unconditioned by social predicaments and circumstance, liberalism regards the subject as being prior to and independent of any shared or given goals, purpose or ends. The subject is thus considered to be prior to and independent of experience and a distinction is made between the person I am and the values I have. Sandel points out that this conception of the individual as an unencumbered self is deeply flawed. It misunderstands both the nature of the individual and that of social institutions. Most of all it fails to give recognition to the constitutive role played by communities in shaping the identity of the individual. The alternative he presents by way of a communitarian perspective, seeks to correct just these lacunae. And in sharp contrast to the liberal perspective, it begins by placing the individual in a community and recognizing the ways in which the self is constituted by the community.

Sandel, Michael,1984, *The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self*, Political Theory, Vol.12, No.1.

- [3] Kymlicka makes a distinction between two kinds of group/ collective rights: internal restrictions and external protection. The first intended to protect the group from the destabilizing impact of internal dissent (e.g. the decision of individual members not to follow traditional practices or customs), whereas the second is intended to protect the group from the impact of external decisions (e.g. the economic or political decisions of the larger society).

Kymlicka, Will,1991, *Liberalism, Community and Culture*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

- [4] The official language that is to be the medium of instruction, or the chosen dress code, are all these

aspects through which the cultural predictions of the dominant group may be expressed. Similarly, liberal policies – e.g. compulsory education for children or absence of financial support to minority educational institutions – could both affect minority communities adversely. Some communities argue that the present system of education is alienating the young from the elders in their community. Besides creating a generation gap, the loss of identity suffered by the young results in a sense of alienation and anomie that can destroy the community itself.

Kymlicka, Will,1991, *Liberalism, Community and Culture*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

- [5] Kymlicka justifies this by arguing that the community's way of life is directly depended upon and linked to the ratio of population to land. If members of the community were to marry outside and continue to live on the same land, the community would not be able to sustain itself. Consequently, he suggests that for the sake of preserving the community from disintegrating or perishing, rights of individuals may be curtailed. In this instance, it means that people who marry outside should relinquish their land rights and be, as it were, expelled from the community.

Kymlicka, Will,1995, *Multicultural Citizenship*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

- [6] Women's groups for instance, find that the language of rights is an insufficient guarantor of their interests. The right to choice may easily be used to support selective abortions of female fetuses.
- [7] Gray, John, 1988, *The Politics of Cultural Diversity*, *The Salisbury Review* (September).
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