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@article{207268,
        author = {Kushagra Dixit and Kartik Kumar Jaiswal and Rahul Mishra},
        title = {Measured Boot Detection of Tampered BIOS Image},
        journal = {International Journal of Innovative Research in Technology},
        year = {2026},
        volume = {13},
        number = {no},
        pages = {192-195},
        issn = {2349-6002},
        url = {https://ijirt.org/article?manuscript=207268},
        abstract = {The integrity of platform firmware has emerged as a critical component of system security, as the BIOS or UEFI represents the foundational layer that governs the boot process. Compromise at this level enables adversaries to establish persistent control, bypass operating system protections, and undermine trust anchors. This paper examines the role of measured boot in detecting tampered BIOS images by leveraging the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and its Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs), together with the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) event log. We analyze how measured boot records can be applied to identify unauthorized modifications, including insertion of hidden code modules, removal of signature verification routines, alteration of bootloader sequences, and manipulation of firmware configuration data. A conceptual detection framework is proposed that combines hash comparison against known-good baselines with rule-based evaluation of event log sequences, enabling recognition of both direct binary changes and structural anomalies. The discussion highlights challenges such as distinguishing malicious alterations from legitimate vendor updates, managing variability across hardware platforms, and minimizing false positives. By synthesizing insights from existing standards and research, this study demonstrates how measured boot can serve as a reliable mechanism for BIOS integrity verification, strengthening supply-chain assurance and enhancing trust in modern computing environments.},
        keywords = {BIOS integrity, Bootloader manipulation, Firmware image modification, Option ROM injection, Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs), Secure Boot, Secure Boot bypass, TCG event log, Trusted Platform Module (TPM), UEFI firmware},
        month = {July},
        }