THE GUARDIAN OF THE BALLOT: JUDICIAL SOVEREIGNTY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS, AND THE FEDERAL SOUL OF INDIAN DEMOCRACY

  • Unique Paper ID: 200925
  • Volume: 12
  • Issue: 12
  • PageNo: 1566-1572
  • Abstract:
  • This chapter examines the role of the Indian judiciary as the ultimate constitutional arbiter of the One Nation, One Election (ONOE) proposal. It analyses how the Supreme Court, through landmark decisions spanning five decades, has constructed a jurisprudential framework that simultaneously acknowledges the administrative appeal of electoral synchronisation and guards against the erosion of federal autonomy and democratic accountability. The chapter traces the evolution of judicial doctrine from Kesavananda Bharati's Basic Structure test through S.R. Bommai's federal shield, and maps how these precedents constrain the 129th Amendment Bill, 2024. The analysis evaluates emerging judicial theories including the Proportionality Test derived from K.S. Puttaswamy, the Doctrine of Colorable Legislation, the concept of Democratic Silence under Article 143, and the notion of Electoral Identity as applied to contested provisions such as the Appointed Date mechanism, the Remainder Term doctrine, the Constructive Vote of No-Confidence, and the Logistical Deferment clause. Drawing upon Public Interest Litigations filed in 2026 and the ongoing Presidential Reference before the Supreme Court, the chapter concludes that the judiciary is likely to mandate a phased-in, consent-based implementation of ONOE rather than permit a unilateral, top-down synchronisation of electoral mandates.

Copyright & License

Copyright © 2026 Authors retain the copyright of this article. This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

BibTeX

@article{200925,
        author = {HEMAALAYA. RA and Ms. DIVYA .S},
        title = {THE GUARDIAN OF THE BALLOT: JUDICIAL SOVEREIGNTY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS, AND THE FEDERAL SOUL OF INDIAN DEMOCRACY},
        journal = {International Journal of Innovative Research in Technology},
        year = {2026},
        volume = {12},
        number = {12},
        pages = {1566-1572},
        issn = {2349-6002},
        url = {https://ijirt.org/article?manuscript=200925},
        abstract = {This chapter examines the role of the Indian judiciary as the ultimate constitutional arbiter of the One Nation, One Election (ONOE) proposal. It analyses how the Supreme Court, through landmark decisions spanning five decades, has constructed a jurisprudential framework that simultaneously acknowledges the administrative appeal of electoral synchronisation and guards against the erosion of federal autonomy and democratic accountability. The chapter traces the evolution of judicial doctrine from Kesavananda Bharati's Basic Structure test through S.R. Bommai's federal shield, and maps how these precedents constrain the 129th Amendment Bill, 2024.
The analysis evaluates emerging judicial theories including the Proportionality Test derived from K.S. Puttaswamy, the Doctrine of Colorable Legislation, the concept of Democratic Silence under Article 143, and the notion of Electoral Identity as applied to contested provisions such as the Appointed Date mechanism, the Remainder Term doctrine, the Constructive Vote of No-Confidence, and the Logistical Deferment clause. Drawing upon Public Interest Litigations filed in 2026 and the ongoing Presidential Reference before the Supreme Court, the chapter concludes that the judiciary is likely to mandate a phased-in, consent-based implementation of ONOE rather than permit a unilateral, top-down synchronisation of electoral mandates.},
        keywords = {},
        month = {May},
        }

Cite This Article

RA, H., & .S, M. D. (2026). THE GUARDIAN OF THE BALLOT: JUDICIAL SOVEREIGNTY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS, AND THE FEDERAL SOUL OF INDIAN DEMOCRACY. International Journal of Innovative Research in Technology (IJIRT), 12(12), 1566–1572.

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